1962 war: The Chinese perspective - Revision history

Jyoti at 12:24, 28 February 2022

2022-02-28T12:24:56Z

Pdewan: /* CONCENTRATING FORCES AND AUDACIOUS ACTION: */

2022-02-21T15:30:27Z

‎CONCENTRATING FORCES AND AUDACIOUS ACTION:

Pdewan at 13:27, 21 April 2015

2015-04-21T13:27:02Z

Pdewan at 14:36, 13 November 2014

2014-11-13T14:36:41Z

Pdewan: Created page with " =1962 war: Chinese perspectives recorded by American scholars= {| class="wikitable" |- |colspan="0"|
This is a collection of articles archived f..."

2014-11-13T14:35:25Z

Created page with " =1962 war: Chinese perspectives recorded by American scholars= {| class="wikitable" |- |colspan="0"|<div style="font-size:100%"> This is a collection of articles archived f..."

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 . Ibid., p. 400.
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 Indpaedia does not endorse the contents of this article in part or whole. Indpaedia  has archived this article because it is an archive of information of interest to the Indian public. It must be pointed that this article was published by the  Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Its ‘distribution is unlimited.’
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 ==PLA LESSONS FROM THE SINO-INDIAN WAR ==
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 . Ibid., p. 400.

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 Indpaedia does not endorse the contents of this article in part or whole. Indpaedia  has archived this article because it is an archive of information of interest to the Indian public. It must be pointed that this article was published by the  Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Its ‘distribution is unlimited.’
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 ==PLA LESSONS FROM THE SINO-INDIAN WAR ==
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 The PLA showed great acumen in carefully executing the  campaign according to the guidelines formulated by Chinese  Communist Party (CCP) Central Military Commission: 1) “to  beat Indian troops soundly,” and 2) “to wipe out the invading  Indian forces totally and rapidly.”56 According to PLA records  from archives, Indian casualties during the war were 4,897 killed  or wounded and 3,968 captured.57 The Indian Defense Ministry,  in 1965, showed 1,383 Indian soldiers killed, 1,696 missing in  action, 3,968 soldiers captured, and 1,047 soldiers wounded.58 In  comparison, PLA casualties in the war were quite small, with 722  Chinese soldiers killed and 1,697 wounded.59 In addition, no soldier  of the PLA was captured during the war, a rarity in the history of  warfare.60 The PLA did all of this damage to the Indian Army with  the equivalent of a reinforced corps (army), deployed and massed at  the critical points along the border.61
-  In that war, according to an appendix of the PLA history of the  “self-defensive counterattack,” some 327 soldiers and officers of the  Chinese force were given awards for heroism. Over half of these  awards were given to members of the Chinese Communist Party or,  in the case of younger soldiers, the Communist Youth League. This  is a small case from which to extrapolate the data, but it seems clear  that, unless party affiliation was a criterion for being considered  a hero, the PLA’s claims that CCP membership and the existence  of the political commissar system may help build esprit d’corps.
+In that war, according to an appendix of the PLA history of the  “self-defensive counterattack,” some 327 soldiers and officers of the  Chinese force were given awards for heroism. Over half of these  awards were given to members of the Chinese Communist Party or,  in the case of younger soldiers, the Communist Youth League. This  is a small case from which to extrapolate the data, but it seems clear  that, unless party affiliation was a criterion for being considered  a hero, the PLA’s claims that CCP membership and the existence  of the political commissar system may help build esprit d’corps.
 Moreover, it is clear that Chinese military leaders lead from the front  and Communist Party members seem to follow them and emerge as  leaders. That is, a substantial number of small unit leaders, whether  squad leaders or platoon and company grade-officers, were given  awards for heroism in combat. In fact, some 160 small unit leaders  were cited for heroism, of which 114 were CCP members. Among  basic soldiers, 158 “fighters” and medics were given awards, of  which 54 were party members. Only three political commissars or  political directors got awards.