Latest revision as of 09:51, 29 March 2026

[edit] History

[edit] Shias in India

Adrija Roychowdhury, March 13, 2026: The Indian Express

Although Shi’ism is often associated with modern-day Iran and Iraq, India has long been home to a distinct and historically influential Shia community. For centuries, Indian Shi’ism evolved through fluid interactions with other Muslim and non-Muslim traditions, while enjoying political patronage from powerful dynasties across the Deccan and North India.

Yet the community’s trajectory changed dramatically in the aftermath of the 1857 revolt against the East India Company. The suppression of the rebellion dismantled key structures of Muslim political authority, confiscated landholdings, and weakened elite patronage networks that had sustained Shia institutions for generations. The upheaval reshaped the social position of Indian Shias and gradually fostered a stronger sense of sectarian identity within a community that had previously been far more fluid.

Migration and political power among Indian Shias Historically, the Shia-Sunni divide emerged immediately after the death of the Prophet in the seventh century CE. The split began as a political dispute over succession but developed into deeper theological, cultural and communal differences over time.

While the Sunnis supported Abu Bakr, who became the successor to the Prophet and the first Caliph of the Islamic community, the Shias were of the opinion that the leadership must remain with the Prophet’s family, and supported Ali ibn Abi Talib, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law.

“The Shia-Sunni divide came to be very clearly established by the year 1000 CE, with their own kinds of notions of fundamental texts and theological positions,” says historian Sajjad Rizvi in an interview with Indianexpress.com. “However, it is only from the 16th century that the identities begin to become rigid, mainly due to the conflicts between the Safavids and the Ottomans,” he adds.

The Safavids, who declared Twelver Shiism as the official religion of Iran in 1501, and the Ottomans, who followed Sunni Islam, used sectarian identity to legitimise political authority. The conflict transformed what had long been a fluid doctrinal difference into a politically enforced sectarian boundary. However, Rizvi explains that these sectarian rigidities did not immediately take root in India.

Nevertheless, the Shia presence in India can be dated as far back in time as the eighth century. The earliest links came through Arab and Persian contacts with the western coasts of India, especially in Sind and Gujarat, after Muhammad bin Qasim conquered Sindh in 711 CE.

Among the migrants, traders, and scholars moving between the Persian Gulf and India were some Shia groups, including followers of the Ismaili Shiism. Ismaili and Zaydi Shia missionaries played a key role in establishing a foothold for Shia Islam in India.

Simon Wolfgang Fuchs, in his article Major Turning Points in Shia Islam in Modern South Asia, notes that by 985 CE, the Friday sermon in Multan, now located in Pakistan’s Punjab province, was being read in the name of the Fatimid Caliphs of Egypt, a powerful Ismaili Shia dynasty that claimed its descent from Fatima, the daughter of Prophet Muhammad.

The major turning point in the history of Shi’ism in India came with the establishment of the Deccani Sultanates of Bijapur, Golconda, and Ahmadnagar. “Indeed it was here rather than in North India, that many established cultural Shia forms, such as the majlis sermon and marsiya poetry, first developed,” writes Justin Jones, a professor of theology, in his book Shia Islam in Colonial India (2012).

The Bahmani Sultanate, which emerged in the Deccan in 1347 after rebelling against the Delhi Sultanate, was largely Sunni but encouraged migration from Persia. As a result, its successor states maintained strong links with Iran, particularly after the rise of the Safavids.

Consequently, the five successor states of the Bahamani kingdom continued to maintain close links with Iran after it came to be ruled by the Shia Safavid dynasty. Three of the Bahamani successor states–Adil Shahi dynasty of Bijapur, Qutb Shahi dynasty of Golconda, and Nizam Shahi dynasty of Ahmadnagar– established strong Shia affiliations, making the Deccan one of the most important centres of Shia political power in South Asia.

In the Bijapur state, for instance, the Friday sermon was read in the name of the 12 imams, and he commissioned the ashurakhanas, buildings designated for Shia mourning ceremonies. In Ahmadnagar, Iranian immigrants played an important role in administration and culture well into the late 16th century.

The most striking example, however, was Golconda. Fuchs writes that Ibrahim Quli Qutb Shah Wali wrote submissive letters to the Safavid ruler Shah Tahmasp I. “His son Muhammad Quli also extended extensive patronage to Iranians, who dominated the court and such areas as ship-owning or trade until the mid-17th century,” he writes. Hyderabad city, founded by Mohammad Quli Qutb Shah in 1591, was so named in honour of Caliph Ali, the first imam of Shia Muslims, based on his title Hyder (lion) or Ali Hyder (Ali the lionheart). The city itself was modelled on Iran’s Isfahan.

Rizvi mentions that the Deccan sultanates established a strong tradition of encouraging scholars to migrate from Iran. “So in the Deccan you get the first articulation of Shia theology in Persian, as well as translation of works from Arabic to Persian, in many cases before they have been done in Iran,” he says.

Awadh and the consolidation of Indian Shi’ism

Even after the dissolution of the Deccani states by the late 16th and 17th centuries, the political power of Shi’ism did not fade out. It was preached by Nurbakshi Sufis in Kashmir. Shia Sayyid families had a powerful presence in several rural townships of North India known as qasbas.

Shia courtiers and ulema (scholars) exerted influence in the Mughal court, even though the ruling dynasty had Sunni affiliations.

Fuchs points to the case of Nurullah Shustari, a prominent Shia scholar who migrated from Iran and established a close relationship with the Mughal emperor Akbar. He was executed in 1610 under the emperor Jahangir, which is why, among South Asian Shias, Shustari is known as the “third martyr”.

Nonetheless, Shia presence in the Mughal state continued unabated. “During the early reign of Aurangzeb,” writes Fuchs, “out of 486 high office-holders, 136 or 28 per cent, were Iranians who hid their beliefs at the Sunni Mughal court.”

Between 1701 and 1757, semi-independent Shia governors ruled Bengal for the Mughals. They constructed the Shia imambarghas in towns such as Murshidabad and Hooghly.

The establishment of Awadh in the 18th century marked a whole new phase in the history of Shi’ism in India.

Rizvi explains that even though the Nawabs of Awadh were of Iranian origin, by the mid-18th century, Safavid rule in Iran had ended and the Shia community shifted its allegiances to the shrine cities of Iraq. “So the first generation of ulema in Lucknow, which was the new capital of the Awadh state, would have built links with the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala in modern-day Iraq. They also brought back those traditions to Awadh and set up their own intellectual circles there,” Rizvi says.

Jones, in an interview with Indianexpress.com, says that Shia culture in Awadh and Iraq worked both ways.

“In that period, southern Iraq depended quite a bit on money and resources from India,” he explains. For example, the Nawabs set up some large bequests of money in Awadh that funded pilgrimage in Iraq. Then there was the case of the canal that brought water to Najaf being funded by Indian money.

“Even after the destruction of the Nawabi state, Lucknow would remain by far the most important Shia spiritual centre in north India,” writes Jones in his book. The city was home to a significant Shia population at all social levels, including many of North India’s most senior Shia scholars, known as mujtahids.

A minority with cultural influence

In terms of sheer numbers, the Shias have historically been a minority among Indian Muslims and continue to be so. But the fact that many ruling dynasties in the Muslim states had Shia affiliation meant that they consciously patronised and sponsored forms of Muslim culture more widely, they came to include many Shia aspects.

“So ultimately many Muslims and not just Shias partook in the same cultures,” says Jones.

The numerical strength of the Shia population was much less important than the cultural influence they had over the subcontinent.

In Awadh, for instance, the state was established by the Nishapuri families from Iran. As the ruling elite, they were themselves small in number. But they built strong cultural connections with the wider strata of Muslim elites in the different qasbas. They sponsored writers of marsiya poetry, who could be Sunnis or Hindus. They also built the imambaras, which turned into public spaces that all Muslims could use. They sponsored the commemoration in Muharram in which both Sunnis and Hindus participated.

It is also to be noted that even when Shia culture in India was being developed through its links with Iran and Iraq, the ruling elites also developed local, unique forms of devotion not tied to the Middle Eastern paradigms.

Historian Karen Ruffle, in an article published in 2017, notes that under the Qutb Shahi dynasty in Hyderabad, a particular form of Shi’ism developed that was rooted in the acquisition, display, and use of relics associated with the Shia imams and members of the household of the Prophet. She calls it “reliquary Shi’ism”, and suggests that it “transformed Hyderabad into a sacred landscape legible to and appealing to a broad religious constituency”.

Why Shi’ism, despite its immense cultural influence, has remained a minority within the broader Muslim community in India is an important historical question.

Jones explains that in Shia Islam, the notion of a strong ancestry is really important. “The cultural power in Shiism in India has always  rested in the fact that it is elite,” he says. “Consequently, for a long time, there was not much of an interest in bringing everybody into the fold.”

Another factor is the historical fluidity of identity. Jones notes that mixed Sunni–Shia families were common and that affiliation could sometimes shift.

Historically, there have always been changing affiliations, and there are plenty of cases of mixed families and marriages. A modern example occurred in Pakistan in the 1980s when military ruler Zia-ul-Haq introduced a state-administered zakat tax. After Shias successfully protested and secured exemption from the policy, some families of mixed background began formally identifying themselves as Shia.

The destruction of the Awadh state by the British after the 1857 rebellion forced the community to reorganise itself. “Until then, it was a religion that was attached to the ruling court. But after the colonial onslaught, the Shias had to find newer ways of organizing the community,” Jones argues. For instance, there could no longer be Shia madrasas patronised by the Nawabs, and so they created religious schools on the basis of community donations. They also had to standardise themselves as a pan-Indian community.

Many leaders of the Muslim community left for Pakistan following the Partition. Jones argues that its impact was more pronounced for the Shias, given their dependence on the big land owners and former princes. For the most part, one saw the impoverishment of the community and its institutions.

Iraq, Iran and Indian Shi’ism today

The rise of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party in Iraq and the rule of Saddam Hussein had indirect but significant consequences for the Shia community worldwide, including in India. It weakened networks of pilgrimage to traditional centres of Shi’ism at Najaf and Karbala and cut down links of education that the community had with Iraq.

Jones says that from the 1970s and 1980s, this contributed to a degree of intellectual stagnation within the community. Politically, however, connections with Iran deepened following the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

Rizvi believes that in contemporary India, many Shias do not always see themselves as sharply distinct from the broader Muslim community. “Minority communities often connect with other minorities,” he says.

It is often during major religious occasions, such as Muharram or the pilgrimage of Arbaeen to Iraq, that the community publicly expresses its distinct identity.

The death of Khamenei, says Rizvi, carries both religious and political dimensions. “In a sense, it is more of a Muslim issue than a Shia one,” he argues, suggesting that even among the Shias, there are those who might see him as a political leader, rather than a religious one.

“In my observation, a majority of Indian Shias consider their major religious authorities to be in Iraq, but some still are also inspired by the Shia political leadership in Iran,” says Jones. Rizvi, however, cautions against framing the death of Khamenei as an attack on Shia culture. Such narratives, he says, could dangerously polarise communities or raise questions of political loyalty.

Ultimately, the story of Indian Shi’ism is one of adaptation, shaped as much by local histories and political upheavals as by the distant centres of the Shia world.

[edit] Population

[edit] Country-Wise, 2009

Shia population, country-wise: Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and the world; Graphic courtesy: The Times of India

Shia population, country-wise: Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and the world

[edit] 2009, in India and the world

Presence of Shia population, 2009, India and the world; The Times of India, June 23, 2017

Shia population, India and the world, 2009