Operation Pawan: 1987
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In brief
India Today December 29, 2008
Political and diplomatic miscalculation that went into India signing the 1987 peace accord with Sri Lanka pitch-forked the 20,000-strong Indian Peace Keeping Force against the very LTTE it had trained to fight the Lankan forces.
“Operation Pawan is a chapter of Indian military history that will contain none of the honour and glory of a victorious campaign,” said India Today in 1987.
A backgrounder
Operation Pawan of the Indian Army All details including Background And Fallout
Summary
Operation Pawan was a military campaign conducted by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka from October 10, 1987, to March 1990, aimed at disarming the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and stabilizing the country amid a brutal civil war that had begun in the early 1980s. The operation was framed within the context of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, which sought to address ethnic tensions between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority, following a series of escalating conflicts and humanitarian crises that necessitated foreign intervention.
Notable for its strategic complexities and high casualty rates, Operation Pawan has been the subject of extensive debate regarding its effectiveness and the consequences of military intervention in civil conflicts.
The operation began with initial successes, including the capture of key territories, but quickly devolved into a protracted engagement as the LTTE employed guerrilla tactics against Indian forces, leading to significant losses on both sides. The IPKF reported over 300 soldiers killed and more than 1,000 wounded, while LTTE casualties were estimated at around 1,100.
The IPKF's involvement also resulted in considerable civilian casualties and humanitarian issues, prompting allegations of human rights violations and complicating India's diplomatic standing in the region. Despite its intended objectives, Operation Pawan has often been characterized as a strategic failure, raising critical questions about the complexities of external military interventions without a coherent political strategy. The fallout from the operation contributed to deteriorating India-Sri Lanka relations and culminated in the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by LTTE operatives in 1991, further complicating the political landscape in the region.
Ultimately, the legacy of Operation Pawan continues to resonate, underscoring the challenges of military engagement in ethnically charged conflicts and the need for a nuanced approach to peacekeeping efforts.
Background
Prelude to Intervention
The roots of the conflict in Sri Lanka can be traced back to the colonial era, which intensified ethnic tensions between the majority Sinhalese and the Tamil minority. Following independence in 1948, discriminatory policies further marginalized the Tamil community, leading to increased grievances and demands for equal rights and autonomy. The rise of militant groups, most notably the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), marked a significant escalation in the struggle for Tamil self-determination, culminating in a violent civil war that began in the early 1980s. In response to the deteriorating situation and humanitarian crises, India initiated "Operation Poomalai" in June 1987, airdropping supplies to Tamil-held areas in Jaffna. This action violated Sri Lankan airspace and prompted a diplomatic response between the governments of India and Sri Lanka, leading to direct negotiations aimed at formulating a political solution to the conflict. The subsequent Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, signed on July 29, 1987, committed Sri Lanka to political devolution and outlined India's role in facilitating disarmament and security in the region.
The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord
The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, formally titled the Agreement to Establish Peace and Normalcy in Sri Lanka, was a pivotal moment in the region's history. It sought to address the escalating ethnic conflict, particularly after the anti-Tamil riots of 1983 and the emergence of militant factions. The accord's provisions included the establishment of a provincial council system to ensure Tamil representation and autonomy, which was intended to quell the unrest and foster peace.
However, the lack of consultation with the LTTE during the negotiations raised skepticism about the effectiveness of the agreement, as key players in the conflict felt excluded from the process. The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was deployed as part of the accord, initially to oversee the disarmament of the LTTE and maintain peace. However, the mission soon evolved into a more complex engagement, with the IPKF facing significant challenges in navigating the realities of counterinsurgency and local dynamics. The initial restrictions on heavy firepower hampered military progress, and as the conflict escalated, the IPKF's role became increasingly controversial.
Impact on Sri Lankan Civil War Trajectory
The deployment of the IPKF and the ensuing operations, particularly "Operation Pawan," aimed to restore order but ultimately led to an escalation of violence. The intervention highlighted the complexities of managing ethnic conflict through military means and raised critical questions about the efficacy of international intervention without a sustainable political framework.
As the situation on the ground deteriorated, the original goals of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord became increasingly elusive, leading to a reevaluation of India's role in Sri Lanka and the eventual withdrawal of the IPKF in 1990.
Execution of Operation Pawan
Overview of Operation Pawan
Operation Pawan was initiated on October 10, 1987, as a military campaign conducted by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in response to the escalating conflict in Sri Lanka, primarily aimed at disarming the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and restoring peace in the region. The operation was framed within the context of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, signed in July 1987, which aimed to establish a political settlement for the ongoing civil war that had been waging since 1983.
Initial Military Engagements
The first phases of Operation Pawan involved conventional military operations, during which the IPKF quickly captured Jaffna, a key strategic location. This success was achieved through the deployment of armored units, helicopter gunships, and artillery support, which allowed for rapid advances against LTTE defenses. The Indian military initially underestimated the LTTE's capabilities, anticipating a swift disarmament of the organization without significant resistance. However, this assumption soon proved to be misguided, as the LTTE adapted to the IPKF's tactics and employed guerrilla warfare strategies that included ambushes, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and snipers.
Shift to Asymmetric Warfare
As the operation progressed, the IPKF encountered fierce resistance from the LTTE, which had transitioned from conventional warfare to asymmetric guerrilla tactics. The LTTE's strategy involved hit-and-run attacks and blending into civilian populations to complicate IPKF targeting. This shift significantly impacted the IPKF's operational effectiveness, as they faced disproportionate casualties due to their unpreparedness for prolonged counter-insurgency operations in densely mined and urban terrain.
Tactical Adjustments and Counterinsurgency
In response to the challenges posed by LTTE tactics, the IPKF adapted its operations by implementing intelligence-driven targeting and establishing joint coordination centers. These measures allowed for preemptive strikes against LTTE command nodes and involved special forces conducting deep insertions for sabotage missions. Despite these innovations, logistical difficulties and the unfamiliar terrain continued to hinder the IPKF's effectiveness, prolonging the conflict and contributing to sustained LTTE resilience.
Outcomes and Casualties
Operation Pawan lasted until March 1990 and concluded with significant casualties on both sides. The IPKF reported 319 soldiers killed and over 1,039 wounded, while LTTE losses were estimated at around 1,100. The high casualty rates reflected the intense urban combat and the difficulties faced by the Indian forces in adapting to guerrilla warfare dynamics. Despite achieving short-term military objectives and securing key territories, the operation's broader implications would lead to complex political repercussions for India and its involvement in Sri Lankan affairs.
Forces Involved
Indian Army Deployment
The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was comprised of multiple divisions and battalions drawn from various segments of the Indian Army. At its inception, the force included the 54th Infantry Division, initially commanded by Major General Harkirat Singh, which was the first Indian military contingent deployed in Sri Lanka, beginning operations from July 30, 1987.
54 Infantry Division
10th Battalion, Parachute Regiment (Special Forces)
65 Armoured Regiment, equipped with T-72 tanks
6th Battalion, Brigade of the Guards
91 Infantry Brigade
5th Battalion, Madras Regiment
8th Battalion, Mahar Regiment
1st Battalion, Maratha Light Infantry
76 Infantry Brigade
12th Battalion, Garhwal Rifles
2nd Battalion, Maratha Light Infantry
25th Battalion, Rajput Regiment
47 Infantry Brigade
11th Battalion, Madras Regiment
5th Battalion, Maratha Light Infantry
14th Battalion, Sikh Light Infantry
36 Infantry Division
115 Infantry Brigade
5th Battalion, 1 Gorkha Rifles
72 Infantry Brigade
- 4th Battalion, 5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force). At its peak, the IPKF had a significant presence in Sri Lanka, featuring approximately 10,000 troops during the early stages, supported by specialized forces and armoured units that aimed to maintain stability amidst the ongoing conflict with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
Mechanised Forces
Among the notable elements of the IPKF were the mechanised forces, which included an Armoured Regiment and several mechanised infantry units. The deployment of mechanised troops was unprecedented in an insurgency context within India and was designed to provide the IPKF with enhanced mobility and firepower. The mechanised units were tasked with performing various operations, including counter-insurgency missions and area domination, which involved securing key locations against LTTE strongholds and ensuring a stable environment for political negotiations.
Special Forces and Adaptation
The IPKF also incorporated special forces, notably from the 10th Battalion of the Parachute Regiment. These units were involved in high-risk operations such as deep insertions for sabotage and targeted eliminations of LTTE cadre, reflecting an adaptive strategy in response to the guerrilla warfare tactics employed by the LTTE. The challenges faced by these forces included limited troop strength, as many battalions operated at only 50% of their capacity due to personnel being on leave or in training. The complexities of operating in unfamiliar terrain, along with the LTTE's use of civilians as human shields, required the IPKF to limit the use of heavy weaponry to minimize civilian casualties. The combined efforts of the various forces within the IPKF exemplified the Indian Army's commitment to the mission, although they faced significant operational challenges, leading to a prolonged engagement that ultimately ended with their withdrawal in March 1990.
Casualties and Impact
The Operation Pawan, undertaken by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka during the late 1980s, resulted in significant casualties and profound impacts on both the local civilian population and the involved military personnel.
Military Casualties
The IPKF also incurred heavy losses during the operation. Official records note that the IPKF experienced 319 killed in action and over 1,300 wounded, while the LTTE's losses were estimated to be around 1,100 dead. The intense combat conditions and the operational challenges contributed to these high casualty figures, with military personnel suffering from not only direct combat injuries but also from the lack of medical supplies and support in critical situations.
Civilian Casualties
The civilian toll during Operation Pawan was devastating. Reports indicate that the conflict led to thousands of civilian casualties, with Amnesty International documenting 43 cases of enforced disappearances attributed to the IPKF in northeastern Sri Lanka from mid-1987 to early 1990. These incidents primarily involved suspected LTTE sympathizers and innocent civilians caught in the crossfire. In one tragic event at Chavakachcheri, thirty Tamil civilians were reportedly killed by Indian troops, with many others suffering severe injuries. The local hospital was overwhelmed with casualties requiring urgent medical attention, highlighting the dire conditions faced by the civilian population amid the conflict.
Psychological and Societal Impact
The aftermath of Operation Pawan deeply affected the psychological state of both soldiers and civilians. For many involved, the brutal nature of the conflict and the indiscriminate suffering it caused led to feelings of disillusionment and grief. Civilians were left grappling with the loss of loved ones and the trauma of violence, while soldiers faced the moral complexities of their actions in a foreign land. The operation fostered a pervasive mistrust of the Indian government among the Tamil population, compounding existing grievances and fueling further tensions between communities. The ramifications of these casualties and the impact of Operation Pawan are still felt today, as they contributed to a prolonged cycle of conflict and strife in the region, highlighting the complexities of military intervention in civil conflicts. Political Implications
Strategic and Political Critiques
The deployment of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka under Operation Pawan has been widely assessed as a strategically inconclusive mission, which brought forth significant political ramifications for India. The intervention was initially intended to stabilize the situation in Sri Lanka and prevent the spillover of conflict into India, especially considering the strategic importance of the region and the potential for escalating separatism that could undermine India's authority as South Asia's leading power. However, this objective was complicated by a lack of cohesive planning and execution among India's military, intelligence, and diplomatic entities, resulting in a quagmire that diminished India's credibility in the region. The consequences of the operation were severe, culminating in the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991, by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in retaliation for India's involvement in Sri Lanka. This event underscored the political dangers of engaging military forces in foreign conflicts without parliamentary consensus and a clear strategy to manage potential backlash, leading to an erosion of trust between India and Sri Lanka and fostering anti-India sentiments among Sri Lankan Tamils.
Human Rights Claims and Counter-Narratives
The intervention was marred by serious human rights allegations against the IPKF, including extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and torture, particularly in the Jaffna district. Reports indicated that the IPKF was involved in civilian massacres during military operations, which only heightened tensions between India and the Tamil community in Sri Lanka. Such violations not only provoked local resentment but also attracted international scrutiny, complicating India's diplomatic relations and positioning in the global arena.
Evolving India-Sri Lanka Relations
The political fallout from Operation Pawan has had lasting implications for India-Sri Lanka relations. Despite the end of the Sri Lankan civil war in May 2009, which prompted a renewed Indian engagement through humanitarian aid and reconstruction projects, underlying tensions remained due to issues related to accountability for wartime atrocities and the treatment of Tamil communities. The lack of resolution on these matters continued to challenge the bilateral relationship, as India navigated its role in promoting stability while also responding to domestic pressures from Tamil Nadu, which had historical and emotional ties to the Tamil population in Sri Lanka. In the wake of the conflict, India has sought to bolster its influence in the region through economic partnerships, exemplified by the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement, which significantly increased bilateral trade, and through strategic cooperation aimed at countering China's growing presence in South Asia. The delicate balance of fostering diplomatic ties while addressing the complex historical grievances stemming from the civil war remains a significant aspect of India's foreign policy in the region.
Fallout
Civilian Impact and Humanitarian Concerns
The deployment of the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) during Operation Pawan had significant humanitarian consequences, particularly for civilians in the conflict zone. Reports indicated widespread civilian suffering due to clashes between the LTTE and IPKF, with incidents of indiscriminate violence resulting in fatalities and injuries among non-combatants. For instance, during a major attack in Chavakachcheri, the local hospital was overwhelmed with casualties, highlighting the severe impact of the military operations on the local population. The reputation of the IPKF suffered greatly as accounts emerged of soldiers engaging in violence against civilians, prompting many to flee in fear of being beaten or shot while attempting to escape the conflict.
Strategic and Political Consequences
Strategically, the intervention is often viewed as a pyrrhic victory for India. While the IPKF did manage to achieve some tactical gains, the overall mission is assessed as strategically inconclusive, with the operation highlighting the complexities of external peacekeeping in the context of local ethnic tensions. The operational failures stemmed from a lack of coherent political guidance, resulting in ad-hoc military responses to fundamentally political issues. The vacillation in policy and absence of a defined exit strategy contributed to prolonged conflict rather than resolution, with India facing criticism for its handling of the situation both domestically and internationally.
Legacy and Lessons Learned
The legacy of Operation Pawan includes crucial lessons for Indian strategic culture and military engagement. The intervention underscored the importance of establishing clear operational boundaries and integrating comprehensive intelligence from the outset of military missions. Additionally, it revealed significant gaps in India's national security coordination, as decisions were often made through informal channels rather than structured civil-military planning. The costs of these shortcomings were borne by soldiers, with a reported 1,171 lives lost during the operation, raising questions about the adequacy of military and political planning in complex conflict scenarios. As India continues to evolve its military and strategic policies, the experiences and outcomes of Operation Pawan serve as a critical reference point for future interventions.
Related Operations
Initiation of the Operation
Operation Pawan, the codename for the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) intervention in Sri Lanka, began in July 1987 following the India–Sri Lanka Accord. This operation was initiated under the premise of facilitating peace and disarmament among various militant groups in the conflict-ridden regions of Sri Lanka, particularly the northern and eastern areas where tensions were highest. The Indian government, motivated by geopolitical considerations and the desire to stabilize Sri Lanka, aimed to counter the influence of regional rivals, particularly Pakistan, which had been supplying military assistance to the Sri Lankan government against Indian-trained Tamil groups.
Decision-Making and Deployment
The deployment of the IPKF involved a significant force, initially comprising elements of the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force, with troop strength eventually exceeding 70,000 personnel . The first contingent, a 10,000-strong force from the 54th Infantry Division, arrived at Palali Airbase on July 30, 1987. This was soon followed by additional divisions, including the 36th Infantry Division, which provided crucial support during the operation. However, the decision-making process was marred by inconsistencies and a lack of clarity in objectives, leading to challenges that ultimately hindered the mission's success.
Employment of Combined Arms Tactics
The operation saw the employment of combined arms tactics as Indian forces aimed to confront the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and disarm its members. Initial strategies included direct military engagement, with the intent to quickly dismantle the LTTE's leadership and disrupt its operations. This culminated in operations such as the Jaffna University helidrop and urban engagements aimed at regaining control in conflict zones. However, this approach soon escalated into a broader conflict, as the LTTE's refusal to disarm led to significant hostilities.
Recognition of Indian Forces' Role
Despite the contentious nature of the IPKF's engagement, there were efforts to recognize the contributions made by Indian forces. The operation's aftermath prompted a detailed analysis of military strategies and operational effectiveness, highlighting key lessons learned regarding the integration of military operations with clear political objectives. The narrative surrounding the IPKF, while often viewed negatively, also underscores the courage and adaptability displayed by Indian troops in a challenging and complex environment.
Remembering the operation
Surendra Singh, April 26, 2024: The Times of India
Veterans keep memory of a ‘forgotten’ mission alive
New Delhi : It had all the dignity and decorum that one associates with a military ceremony. Except, it was a ‘private’ function. A group of Indian army veterans and their families quietly gathered at the National War Memorial to lay wreaths in memory of the fallen soldiers of ‘Operation Pawan’, which India had launched in the late 1980s to save its neighbour Sri Lanka from disintegration. To those who participated in the operation, it seems like it happened just yesterday. But almost four decades have gone by. To recap, in the late 1980s, Sri Lanka was in the throes of severe insurgencies that threatened its territorial integrity. The Rajiv Gandhi govt dispatched the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to bring stability and peace in Sri Lanka.
India lost 1,171 personnel, who were killed in action, while nearly 3,500 were wounded during Op Pawan that continued from 1987 to 1990. Nearly 100,000 troops from the tri-service were under the command of IPKF headquarters. Interestingly, the IPKF headquarters was India’s first joint operations military command and it set a precedent for future theatre commands, which the current Indian military leadership is now planning to set up.
The IPKF was awarded one Param Vir Chakra, one Sarvottam Yudh Seva Medal, 98 Vir Chakra and over 250 other gallantry awards. Despite so many casualties and military honours, the apex military hierarchy termed Op Pawan a ‘minor’ operation. As a result, it does not get a formal commemoration day at the National War Memorial.
A few years ago, a group of Op Pawan veterans and their families decided that the sacrifices of those who laid down their lives during the mission would not go unremembered. Every year, they gather to pay homage to the bravehearts who fell while fighting for the cause of their nation in a foreign land.
The Sri Lanka govt has erected a magnificent War Memorial in Colombo to honour the supreme sacrifices made by the IPKF troops, where wreaths are laid twice a year.”
In 2024, the presence of 50 uniformed personnel from the Rajputana Rifles regiment and 50 NCC cadets, standing shoulder to shoulder with the proud veterans, added grace and colour to the solemn ‘private’ ceremony.
