Dr Manmohan Singh

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India’s Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh: a portrait by George W. Bush, the then President of the United States of America

Dr. Manmohan Singh

This is a collection of articles archived for the excellence of their content.

A summing up

Subodh Ghildiyal, Dec 27, 2024: The Times of India

It was likely his darkest hour as PM – the shine of popular approbation, a key factor in Congress-led alliance’s 2009 election win, had worn off, to be replaced by ominous clouds with nary a silver lining in sight. But Manmohan Singh, then at the helm of UPA-2’s scandals-hit govt, where ministerial bickerings were routine, had a different take. “History will be kinder to me,” he said.


He was right. And anyone, no matter their politics, would have agreed with Dr Singh’s self-assessment as news broke that he breathed his last in AIIMS on Thursday, on a cold, foggy Delhi evening. 


No Indian PM could match him in nonchalance when facing a blizzard of bad news. Recall those days — Commonwealth scam, 2G scam, coal scam, Manmohan’s big mantris behaving as if they didn’t have a boss, Rahul Gandhi tearing up a bill okayed by Singh govt that opened a backdoor for convicted netas to come back to electoral politics.


What informed the serene Sikh’s cool self-confidence in the face of excoriating banner headlines on corruption and dysfunction? One, Singh was, in public life, unflappable. Two, he knew, even if his critics forgot in the heat of news, his legacy as the man who changed India’s economic destiny was unchallengeable.


The journey to his taking charge of India’s economy showed another key trait in him. He was a determined pragmatist who smartly read the tea leaves of both politics and governance. When Indian Socialism was all the rage, he was an excellent technocrat serving the licence-permit raj, When that very economic regime nearly brought India to ruin, and Narasimha Rao picked him — after IG Patel had turned down Rao’s offer to be FM — to save the economy by changing India’s economic DNA, Singh, with equal felicity, became the Sardar of Reforms.


Communists and protection-loving corporate chiefs dissed Singh. It didn’t affect him one bit. The 1991 rewriting of industrial policy and the budget that followed are milestones in India’s evolution. If India is today reckoned globally as a serious economic player, if it’s pegged as a future economic heavyweight, it all goes back to those key calls taken by a quiet man.

A change-maker who put the country on a better path

Singh’s story is all the more riveting because not just his ascension to FM, but even to the country’s top job were, as his former press adviser Sanjaya Baru had described, accidental. He wouldn’t have been FM had Patel taken the job. He wouldn’t have been PM had Sonia Gandhi not decided to rule herself out of the job after Congress+ beat BJP+ in a dramatic upset in 2004.


The thing is he took to both jobs as if he were made for them. On May 19, 2004 evening, standing on the forecourt of Rashtrapati Bhavan with Singh at her side, Sonia announced him as PM by saying, “the country will be safe in Dr Manmohan Singh’s hands”.


Her praise can be parsed in two ways. Safe for Gandhis because he would be loyal to the family, and safe for India because Singh’s competence and professional creds were never in doubt. Plus, there were the political returns for Congress in picking a Singh PM — 1984’s wounds and memories were still raw.


Singh, despite his reforms record, was often thought as a political nov- ice, especially against wily Congress netas who made a career out of Machiavellian durbar politics. Critics were wrong again. The 2008 nuclear deal with US, shepherded by him against not just BJP and CPM charges of selling the country down but also against disquiet inside Congress, was a masterclass in wiliness.


Singh got CWC to twice endorse the nuclear deal, shrugged off Left walking out of UPA-1, and won a LS vote of confidence. ‘Singh is King’, headlines said.


Singh is wise, was the verdict of many world leaders, notably Republican George Bush and his successor Democrat Barack Obama. Obama was particularly impressed. When G20 was born as the financial crisis upended a decade-long bull run everywhere, and various heads of govt spoke, Obama singled out Singh: “When Dr Singh speaks, the world listens”, the then US president said.


But as happens in rough electoral politics, even the wisest ones are not always listened to. Coming into 2009 LS polls, the economy just about emerging from the taper tantrum and his political and economic stewardship under the scanner, Congress took a drubbing against Modi-led BJP.


Singh, both before and after results, spoke of the dangers of ‘majoritarianism’. A Partition refugee and a minority in Hindu-majority India, he probably had an acute personal attachment to secular politics. But it went beyond that. He was a political liberal by conviction. Singh’s comments on Modi could be seen as typical loser’s gripe. But there was more to it. He believed India couldn’t afford majoritarian politics.
Singh faded away from public life as badly beaten PMs often do. There was just one post-2014 moment when he, and his credibility, came up front and centre. Congress picked him as the man who would coordinate the party’s pandemic policy.


He advised the party leadership, he spoke to Congress CMs, and ordinary Congress workers would never tire of reminding reporters that he was the right man to take the lead in tough times. Didn’t he, after all, bring India out of an economic hole?


Singh wrote a letter to Modi, offering suggestions on vaccination policy. A later SC judgment showed why Singh was talking a lot of sense. That was his last hurrah. His health dipped, Modi became politically stronger. Congress floundered. When Congress recovered some ground in 2024 LS polls, Singh wasn’t a player. But he’ll always be seen as a transformer, a changemaker who put the country on a better path. Nothing and no one can take that away. And, perhaps less obviously, he will always be remembered for having taught the country a political lesson – never underestimate the poker-faced, quiet politician.


The serene gentlemanly Singh got the better of many voluble netas, and not a few loudmouths. He was always known to be a very decent man. He was also an exceptionally astute one.

TURNED CRISIS INTO OPPORTUNITY

➤ Born Sept 26, 1932 in what is now Pak Punjab. Studied economics at Cambridge and did his doctorate at Oxford


➤ 1971: Joined Govt of India as economic adviser in commerce ministry. Was RBI governor 1982-85 and Planning Commission deputy chairman 1985-87 


➤ Appointed finance minister in 1991 as India grappled with severe economic crisis. Architect of India’s liberalisation during his stint as FM till 1996 


➤ Took office of PM on May 22, 2004 after Sonia Gandhi declined the post and chose him instead. Became PM again on May 22, 2009 with many crediting his successful first term for UPA’s victory. But UPA’s second term was marred by scams, and it was trounced in 2014 LS polls

Landmarks in his legacy: RTI, RTE, NREGA, N-deal

It was under Manmohan Singh’s stewardship that UPA govt enacted several rights-based legislations— right to information (RTI), right to education (RTE) and job guarantee (later MGNREGA), among others. Singh’s first term also saw the introduction of OBC quotas in education, a move initially resisted by several cabinet colleagues. He had summed up RTE, saying, “I am what I am today because of education.” A nuclear pact with the US was also a major achievement.

Joined pre-med on dad’s prodding, but lost interest

Manmohan Singh had joined a pre-medical course as his father wanted him to become a doctor but pulled out after a couple of months, losing interest in the subject, according to a book on the late former PM by his daughter.
“In fact, he had also lost interest in studying science,” Daman Singh wrote, adding that economics was a subject that appealed to him. While studying at Cambridge, Daman said her father even had to skip meals or survive on a chocolate bar when money ran out.

The three Manmohan Singhs

I honestly believe that history will be kinder to me than the contemporary media, or for that matter, the Opposition parties in Parliament, Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh, January 04, 2014 | The Hindu

Why history, even the present admires the author of India’s growth story

People tend to judge Dr Manmohan Singh by his performance as Prime Minister between 2009 and 2014, a period known politically as UPA II and marked by extremes of governmental corruption and a virtually non-existent central government.

However, there are three Manmohan Singhs,

i) As the national Finance Minister (1991-96), Dr Manmohan Singh inherited an economy that was in ruins. However, working under Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao, Dr Singh was able to steer India to a creditable growth rate. India’s GDP growth averaged 5.1% over those five years, most of the growth coming in the last four years. It were the reforms ushered in by Dr Singh under PM Mr Rao that put India on its subsequent high growth path.

ii) Dr Manmohan Singh was the Prime Minister of India between 2004 and 2009, a period known politically as UPA I. Dr Singh headed a fragile coalition but still managed to take bold steps. He stood up to the USA (and India’s opposition parties, left as well as right, both of which had taken a stand inimical to India’s national interests) on the nuclear issue (see below). This resoluteness won him the admiration of the voters, who increased the number of seats held by the UPA in the 2009 elections.

iii) UPA II (2009- 2014) was, of course, a different story. Dr Singh (born 26 September 1932) was between 77 and 82 years of age, and no longer as fit or alert as before: apart from external factors.

And yet during UPA II India recorded its highest ever GDP growth in a single year. (See Gross domestic product (GDP): India )

Indeed, at 8%, the growth of India’s GDP during Dr Manmohan Singh’s 10 years as PM was higher than what was achieved under any Indian Prime Minister, from 1951 to 2018. (See Gross domestic product (GDP): India )

Therefore, why just history, even the present is grateful to the author of India’s growth story

Personal life

Born 26 September 1932

In Gah, West Punjab

Wife Gursharan Kaur (m. 1958)

Children Upinder, Daman (see below), Amrit

Educated at Panjab University, Chandigarh

St John's College, Cambridge

Nuffield College, Oxford

Career

Briefly

Governor of the Reserve Bank of India 15 September 1982 – 15 January 1985

Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission 15 January 1985 – 31 August 1987

Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha) 1991-- Constituency Assam

Minister of Finance 21 June 1991 – 16 May 1996

Leader of the Opposition in the Rajya Sabha 21 March 1998 – 21 May 2004

13th Prime Minister of India 22 May 2004 – 26 May 2014

A summing up: in 2024

Neerja Chowdhury, April 5, 2024: The Indian Express

In 2014, towards the end of his second term as the Prime Minister, Singh had said, “History will be kinder to me than the media.” This was at a time when he was getting attacked for being a “weak PM”, with Sonia Gandhi acknowledged as the power behind the throne during the two terms of his premiership.

The 91-year-old Manmohan Singh has just retired from active politics — after being an MP for 33 years. And as India readies for another mega electoral battle, and as parties start trading fireworks, it is a moment to consider the journey this scholarly, soft-spoken, cautious leader attacked for his silences – he was called “mauni baba” – has made. After Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, he is the only Indian PM who ruled for ten years.

His sixth Rajya Sabha term ended on Wednesday. He has always been a member of the Upper House.

Singh contested the Lok Sabha election once — from South Delhi in 1999 — but lost. It was suspected at the time that some senior Congress leaders had worked behind the scenes to ensure his defeat in a bid to prevent him from acquiring the image of a popularly elected leader. After that, the once-bitten, twice-shy Singh never attempted a run for the Lok Sabha – not taking that risk even when he was the PM from 2004 to 2014.

Interestingly, as he retired from the Rajya Sabha, Sonia Gandhi enters the Upper House for the first time as a Congress MP from Rajasthan — the state that Singh represented for the last six years, having been elected to the House earlier from Assam.

Today, one wonders what would be Singh’s thoughts on his journey – his achievements as well as what he would have liked to have done differently. What worried him the most, it seemed to me during our conversation, was the enormous “bitterness” that had crept in the relations between the ruling side and the Opposition, which he felt was “not good” for democracy.

Singh’s rise from humble beginnings to the pinnacle of power is the story of a self-made man; that such a rise can take place in India is to the credit of India’s incredible democracy, however faltering it may be. Born in Gah, a backward village in west Punjab (now in Pakistan), which did not have any school, health facilities or electricity, he used to walk miles to go to an Urdu medium school — and would study under the kerosene lamp at night. He attributed his rise to the “system of scholarships” for poor students that existed at the time.

There are few individuals in public life who have had the kind of experience that Singh acquired while heading a slew of the country’s top institutions of governance – from being chief economic advisor and Reserve Bank of India governor to finance secretary and UGC chairperson. He also became the Planning Commission deputy chairman with a deep understanding of the country’s federal set-up and Centre-state relations.

After holding these key positions, he was brought in 1991 as a “technocrat” finance minister by P V Narasimha Rao when the latter suddenly became the PM in the wake of Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination. Even before his swearing-in, Rao found himself confronted with a severe balance of payment crisis and India on the verge of a default. While Rao took the bold decision of taking India out of the “licence quota raj” towards structural reforms — India’s options were limited as the Soviet Union had collapsed and it was a US-led unipolar world it faced — he was ably assisted by Manmohan Singh as they went on to usher in reforms and stabilise the economy. A champion of economic liberalisation, Singh as the PM later presided over an expanding economy with a trajectory of high growth.

It was an unexpected turn of events which made Singh the “accidental Prime Minister” in 2004. Sonia Gandhi was elected as the Congress Parliamentary Party leader after the general elections, and was also chosen as the UPA chairperson. But she decided not to become the PM.

Sonia anointed Singh as the PM, which created an unusual power-sharing model — she took care of the “political” decisions and he of “governance” (even though the two are inseparable). She was soon seen as the real power centre. But Singh, in the words of one of his ministers, remained “endlessly gracious” even when his instructions were ignored by his colleagues who looked up to Sonia Gandhi more for steers.

He was likened to a blade of grass which bends when the storm comes, not like a tree which stands erect and crashes. That is one of the reasons why he survived for ten years as the PM.

He “accommodated“ not just Sonia but also senior leaders like Pranab Mukherjee who had to work under him. Mukherjee headed most of GoMs (Group of Ministers) and EGoMs (Empowered GoMs) , through which Singh chose to run his government. He used to address Pranab as “sir” before he became PM – and for some time even afterwards until Pranab urged him not to do it.

Soon after he took charge as the PM, one of the first questions Singh had to address was where to get Sonia seated in Parliament. This was a tricky issue, given her enhanced stature after saying “no” to the PMship. It was again Pranab who came to his rescue and found a satisfactory seating arrangement for her in the front row.

In September 2013 , Rahul Gandhi “gate-crashed” a press conference and trashed an ordinance cleared by the Manmohan Singh Cabinet, calling it “complete nonsense”. The ordinance had overturned the Supreme Court’s ruling that MPs would immediately lose their membership if they were sentenced to a prison term of at least two years. It was seen as Singh’s weakest moment as the PM. Many felt he would resign. He did not. What is not so widely known is that Rahul had apologised to Singh afterwards, as per informed sources.

There was, however, one issue on which he remained unyielding, no matter what the obstacles that came his way — the Indo-US nuclear deal (in 2008), which led to a strategic relationship with the US, a process which continues apace. Singh and US President George Bush enjoyed a remarkable chemistry in their relations. Bush the loud, hearty Texan was impressed with Manmohan Singh’s “integrity, intelligence and self deprecating ways” and would ask his officials, “What does Manmohan Singh want? I am committed to him.” Though deals are about the self interest of nations, and the US saw India as a counter to China in the region, it might not have gone through without Bush and Singh at the heart of it. They pursued it with a dogged zeal for over 39 months.

It was during this period that Singh showed a political savvy few thought he possessed, displaying a killer instinct, deploying “saam daam dand bhed”, getting the better of Sonia, who opposed the deal initially, and the Left parties, which threatened to withdraw their critical support and finally did it. Sonia’s powerful political secretary Ahmed Patel was heard remarking in frustration, “Who is Doctor Sahib to decide about alliances, that is the job of the party (Congress)?”

But Singh mobilised alternative support from the Samajwadi Party – belying the belief about him that he was politically naïve and essentially a bureaucrat. While he was viewed as a “weak PM”, and scams were to riddle his second term, in this instance, he showed that he could hold his own and be his own man.

Singh would have chafed against being hemmed in as the PM by an assertive Congress brass, though he did not go public about it. He did threaten to resign several times during his premiership– but did not go ahead and do it.

The architect of India’s economic reforms, the only Sikh PM the country has had, Singh was chosen as the PM because he was Sonia’s best bet. He had no personal agenda, nor a constituency of his own.

But a key question that history may judge him on — kindly or otherwise — is this: Even though the 2004 model underlined a power-sharing arrangement with Sonia, could Singh have pushed the envelope more, with a greater assertion of the authority of the position of the Prime Minister of India?

(Neerja Chowdhury, Contributing Editor, The Indian Express, has covered the last 10 Lok Sabha elections. She is the author of ‘How Prime Ministers Decide’)

A timeline

The Times of India, Aug 28, 2011

He first made headlines as finance minister in 1991, but Manmohan Singh has been part of various governments’ core economic group much longer

INDIRA GANDHI (Cong) : Economic advisor, ministry of foreign trade (1971-72) Chief economic advisor, ministry of finance (1972-76) Director, RBI (1976-77)

MORARJI DESAI & CHARAN SINGH (Janata Party): Director, RBI (1977-80) Secretary, dept of economic affairs, ministry of finance (1977–80)

INDIRA GANDHI (Cong) : Member-secretary, Planning Commission (1980-1982)

Governor, RBI (1982–84)

Member, Economic Advisory Council to the PM (1983-84)

RAJIV GANDHI (Cong) : Governor, RBI (1984–1985) President, Indian Economic Association (1985)

Deputy chairman, Planning Commission (1985–87)

Secretary-general and commissioner, South Commission, Geneva (1987-89)

V P SINGH (Janata Dal) : Secretary-general, South Commission, Geneva (1989-90)

CHANDRASHEKHAR (Samajwadi Janata Party)

Advisor to the PM on economic affairs (1990–91)

P V NARASIMHA RAO (Cong)

Union finance minister (1991–1996)

OTHER POSITIONS

Member, consultative committee for the ministry of finance (1996 onwards)

Chairman, parliamentary standing committee on commerce (1996 -97)

Member, committee on finance (1998 onwards).

A lacklustre second term

After bright start, PM faded away in 2nd term

The Times of India May 16 2014

Rajeev Deshpande New Delhi:

TNN

Singh Failed To Read The Writing On The Wall, Dithered On Reforms While Scams Derailed Economy

As a warm autumn sun shone benignly on a Cambridge lawn, the champagne being passed around seemed a perfect toast to the prime minister of India.

It was fitting that a ceremony to honour a former student with an honorary degree matched a growing recognition of India's rise as a nation, mentioned in the same breath as China.

In 2006, Manmohan Singh was coasting, his Cambridge laurel a small diversion, as he headed for an EU summit where his invocation of India as a $1 trillion investment opportunity sounded perfectly credible. As it turned out, the road thereafter got rockier. The 2008 India-US nuclear deal resulted in enormous turmoil. Singh won the day , but the victory was tainted by the cash-forvote scandal.

Yet, Congres won the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, brushing aside L K Advani's challenge. Singh did seem to recognize the need to nurture the gains, telling colleagues that the youth vote in particular tends to be impatient and volatile. He rightly felt that some credit for schemes like rural employment guarantee, farm loan waiver and Bharat Nirman was due to him and calculated he could push ahead with some of his pet agenda.

Looking back, Singh may have been better served if he had concentrated on the economy rather than engaging in risky foreign policy gambits like bettering ties with Pakistan. While the backlash to Sharm el-Sheikh rudely reminded Singh of the limits of his powers, he let slip an opportunity to tend to the economy at a time when the global climate was still fragile.

In mincing his steps, he failed to factor in the obvious: that three strong doses of financial stimulus had masked the impact of the global slowdown and much needed to be done to protect growth. So while the government dithered on reforms, Singh found himself battling the Commonwealth Games scam that broke in 2010. Around the same time, the 2G scam, with its roots in UPA-1, erupted in full force.

The honeymoon of his second term was over before it began.

The question whether things could have been handled differently is answered in Singh's lack of decisiveness in a crisis. The PM allowed senior ministers to convince him to let the 2G scandal play out in court, rather than examining solutions like cancelling the tainted contracts.

The argument that this would hurt business confidence and dent an economy under stress could be trumped by the much more urgent need to restore political credibility .

Singh chose the easier option, the economy worsened and BJP's graph rose. At a time when the economy needed his attention, Singh found Pranab Mukherjee as finance minister a handful, with officials recalling how Mukherjee's baritone dominated Cabinet meetings.

Constrained as he was by Congres chief Sonia Gandhi being the power behind the scene, Singh did not use what authority he could still wield. Being more assertive would have helped both him and Congres.

Sadly for the PM, there is no clarity whether he did indeed try to cap the corruption scandals that corroded his legacy. There is little evidence to suggest he did so energetically .

The Commonwealth Games were saved only at the last minute. Coalgate ensured power projects stagnated while the mining sector slipped into negative growth, drowning out lakhs of jobs.

The scandals soon affected policy making as the government was pinned down by a tough auditor and a combative opposition.

As the stasis deepened, Singh became more and more besieged, though he took the position that the graft controversies were “party matter“ for which he could not be held accountable.

His leadership was wanting when Anna Hazare's agitation cramped the government. It took him days to address the nation after the Nirbhaya case even as Delhi's streets were awash with protests led by the very youth of whose impatience he had warned.

He had his foreign policy successes. On occasions, like when he apologized to Sikhs for the 1984 killings, he stood head and shoulders over other leaders.

But for all his innate decency ,a record free of the taint of corruption and his erudition, Singh ended his 10 years in office a somewhat discontented figure. He failed to see that not exercising authority is a poor option, irrespective of the circumstance.

2009: After PM, no designated No 2

[ From the archives of the Times of India]

Rajeev Deshpande & Himanshi Dhawan TNN

In keeping with precedent where L K Advani, Charan Singh and Jagjivan Ram were never designated number 2, no charge designating any minister as “acting PM” has been issued whenever Prime Minister Manmohan Singh could not attend a Cabinet meeting. Information provided under the Right to Information, however, shows on nine occasions between January 27 and February 26, 2009, when the Cabinet met in Singh’s absence Pranab Mukherjee presided over meetings. He was then the external affairs minister.

The RTI reply officially settles the no number 2 policy and states that during the PM’s visits abroad in the 2004-11 period instructions were issued that the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs may be authorized to decide on issues of national urgency. “The CCPA will be presided over by the senior most minister. No instructions were issued by the cabinet secretariat for any period other than the period of the PM’s visits abroad for disposal of business,” the RTI reply states. While the instructions enshrine a “collective” or a “council of elders” approach to decision-making, Mukherjee has no reason to feel unappreciated as he is clearly the de facto if not de jure number 2 in both UPA-I and II governments as is evident from details of Cabinet meetings held when the PM underwent cardiac surgery in January 2009. Throughout UPA-I and II, there has been a deliberate ambiguity on formalizing the number 2 slot with the Congress leadership making it amply clear that Singh is the sole number 1 and there are no rankings after him. He is listed at number 1 in the list of those present at cabinet meetings held on January 27 and 28, 2009.

Foreign policy

Reflected India’s development priorities

Sachin Parashar, Dec 28, 2024: The Times of India

New Delhi : Manmohan Singh believed India’s development priorities should shape its foreign policy and, in his own words, create a global environment conducive for India’s growth. It was with this in mind that he met President George Bush in 2005 on the margins of the UNGA and asked him if the US could help India access clean energy in the face of many embargoes it had been facing since the 1998 nuclear tests. The rest, as they say, is history. 
India and the US went on to finalise the civil nuclear deal three years later, paving the way for a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Groupfor India to carry out nuclear commerce without signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treatybut, more importantly, for a seat at the global high table of diplomacy.How he overcame stiff opposition from Left parties and others, even risking his govt, is well documented. Aman of conviction, Singh believed the US deal was in India’s interest and it helped that Sonia Gandhi probably felt the same and backed him. Singh knew not just how hard Bush had worked for the deal but also how keen he was on having strong ties with India.


This was India’s chance, and he would not allow it to go abegging. The spirit behind this landmark agreement, which brought India and the US together after years of mistrust, continues to act as a guiding framework for the bilateral relationship, even as it moves on to another potentially transformational stage with the recently launched Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology.


Apart from India’s development priorities, there were many other factors — or more specifically five principles — that coalesced into forming Singh’s foreign policy agenda.
These included his firm belief in stable, long-term and mutually beneficial ties, greater integration into the world economy and a “shared destiny” of the Indian subcontinent that necessitated greater regional cooperation and connectivity. According to Singh, foreign policy should not just be about interests, but also values dear to Indian people. “India’s experiment of pursuing economic development within the framework of a plural, secular and liberal democracy has inspired people around the world and should continue to do so,” the former PM said, addressing Indian ambassadors and high commissioners in 2013.


While the nuclear deal with the US stood out for the message it conveyed to the world about India’s arrival on the global stage, there were other significant foreign policy issues that Singh pursued with elan. Singh’s handling of China, his efforts to solidify relations with Asean in the form of the 2012 strategic partnership and efforts to ramp up India’s global trade and integration into the world economy to reduce poverty are also among the highlights of Singh’s external focus.


While PM Modi has been credited with transforming ties with the Gulf, it was Singh who launched India’s Look West Policy to boost ties with the region. In fact, many of the policies India has been pursuing currently, whether related to Asean or even Quad, remain rooted in initiatives undertaken under Singh. According to former Australian PM Kevin Rudd, it was the joint response to the 2004 tsunami by the US, Australia, Japan and Indian under Singh that was at the heart of former Japanese PM Shinzo Abe’s efforts to launch Quad. He remains the only PM in recent decades to have come anywhere close to resolving the Kashmir issue.


As a Wikileaks cable revealed in 2011, Singh confirmed to a visiting US delegation two years earlier that he and then Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf had agreed through back-channel talks to a “non-territorial solution” to the dispute.


As Musharraf had said earlier, this was a four-point peace plan that included free trade and movement across LoC, demilitarisation, maximum autonomy and joint management of the area. Singh himself did not elaborate about the contents of the so-called peace formula but told the US delegation that India and Pakistan had made great progress on the issue till early 2007, or when Musharraf started to run into trouble domestically.


The Pakistani govt that followed dismissed the peace plan as a personal initiative of the former president. While Singh was often accused by the opposition of being soft on Pakistan, the former Prime Minister never travelled to the country during his 10 years in office.

China, Pakistan, the USA

C. RAJA MOHAN, Dec 28, 2024: The Indian Express



Turning around the US relationship amidst widespread political, intellectual, and bureaucratic hostility will go down as Manmohan Singh’s greatest strategic legacy as prime minister. It complemented and reinforced his contribution to India’s economic rise in the 1990s

As finance minister during 1991-96, Manmohan Singh laid the foundation for India’s economic transformation and the consequent rise on the global stage. Less appreciated is his decade-long tenure as prime minister, from 2004 to 2014, which helped develop a matching foreign policy strategy through regional peace and a global partnership with the United States.

But difficulties with his own party, opposition from the left and right of the political spectrum, and entrenched resistance from the bureaucracy and the foreign policy community prevented Singh from realising the new diplomatic possibilities that came his way very early on in his tenure.

Within the span of a few weeks during early 2005, as prime minister, Singh had the opportunity to explore major breakthroughs in three of India’s most challenging relationships — with Pakistan, China, and the US. The story of Singh’s foreign policy was largely about how his three diplomatic initiatives in the spring and summer of 2005 unfolded in the rest of his time as PM.

To be sure, the three possibilities had emerged under Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1998-2004) and were ripe for picking under Manmohan Singh. After all, foreign policy is a continuum that does not end with one government and begin with another. But each government brings something subjective — in terms of worldview, political will, and domestic capability — in dealing with the objective external circumstances.

In the end, it is important to remember that your interlocutor has a veto. It is not all about us. One needs a willing sovereign across the table to turn opportunities into outcomes. If Pakistan and China were not convinced of the need for immediate peace with India, Washington was eager to build a new and expansive relationship with Delhi.

P V Narasimha Rao and Vajpayee navigated the many external crises trying new approaches to Pakistan, China, and the US. This included the testing of five nuclear weapons by Vajpayee in 1998. Inheriting a favourable situation, Singh pushed the accelerator on the three diplomatic fronts.

The visit of General Pervez Musharraf in April 2005, ostensibly to watch a cricket match in Delhi, provided the occasion to explore the broad contours of a settlement on the Kashmir question. Serious back-channel negotiations on Kashmir — conducted by Ambassador Satinder Lambah from the Indian side — could not, however, be brought to a close.

The ruling leadership of the Congress party was utterly uncomfortable making big moves with Pakistan. The party would not even let Singh visit Pakistan. As Delhi dithered, the momentum dissipated on the Pakistan side as Musharraf’s power began to ebb and relations were back in crisis mode after the Pakistan-sponsored terror attacks on Mumbai during November 2008.

It is pointless to speculate whether stronger political will in Delhi could have given a new direction to India-Pakistan relations during 2005-07. But there is no denying that a major diplomatic opportunity with Pakistan was lost.

April 2005 also saw the visit of the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, to Delhi and the signing of an agreement on the principles and parameters for settling the intractable boundary dispute between Delhi and Beijing. It was indeed the first time that such an understanding was finalised.

But the negotiations to settle the boundary soon stalled, as Beijing began to reinterpret the provisions of the agreement. Although India was eager for a settlement, Beijing seemed reluctant as the power gap between the two nations widened rapidly in favour of China from the mid 2000s.

As a rising China under Xi Jinping turned politically assertive and unveiled muscular approaches to boundary disputes with its neighbours, the Sino-Indian relations too entered a complex mode. This was reflected in a series of military crises. The first major border flareup occurred in 2013 towards the end of the UPA rule.

Singh’s American story turned out to be very different, and consequential. In March 2005, Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser of President George W Bush came to Delhi promising to resolve the long-standing nuclear dispute with India. That, in turn, was part of a new US initiative to rearrange the Asian security order with India as a strong regional partner.

Quick diplomatic action after that saw Delhi and Washington sign a defence cooperation agreement in June 2005 and a civil nuclear initiative in July 2005. The scale and potential scope of the new diplomatic engagement with the US flustered the Congress party amidst vigorous opposition from the left allies of the UPA. If Vajpayee had created the nuclear opening with the US, Lal Krishan Advani’s BJP attacked Singh’s historic deal with Bush. The left and the BJP joined hands to pull down the Manmohan Singh government.

The government survived the challenge but the Congress leadership had no political appetite for wrapping up the nuclear initiative with the US. It was Singh’s threat to resign that pushed the Congress Party to formalise the initiative in 2008.

Although he returned as PM in 2009 with a bigger mandate, Singh struggled to implement the many new agreements with the US. The Congress leadership had little political interest in that project.  It needed the government of Narendra Modi, who enjoyed a majority in the Lok Sabha with full control over his party’s foreign policy, to do the heavy lifting on the strategic partnership with the United States.

However, if Singh had not acted with great conviction to put his crown on the line in 2008, it would have been much harder for the Modi government, which was certainly bolder and more self-assured, to rapidly transform the US relationship over the last decade.

Turning around the US relationship amidst widespread political, intellectual, and bureaucratic hostility will go down as Manmohan Singh’s greatest strategic legacy as prime minister. It complemented and reinforced his contribution to India’s economic rise in the 1990s.

It was also the willing partners in Washington — successive American presidents George Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden — that helped turn the US into the most valuable partner for India today. Neither Singh nor Modi had such luck with Pakistan and China, both remaining major challenges for India.

In the end, Manmohan Singh’s diplomatic life highlights two important lessons. One is the importance of a sovereign seizing fleeting diplomatic opportunities that arise. The other is the need for a solid domestic political consensus on foreign policy that is so important in converting ephemeral diplomatic moments into lasting strategic outcomes.

Malaysia’s jailed prime minister

Dec 28, 2024: The Times of India

New Delhi : Malaysian PM Anwar Ibrahim posted a poignant tribute to Dr Manmohan Singh on ‘X’ Friday, recalling the many kindnesses of “his cherished friend” when he, Anwar, was incarcerated, and describing him as “slightly awkward as a politician but undeniably upright, steadfast and resolute as a statesman”, a man “whose legacy would inspire generations to come”.


Singh was “the midwife of India’s emergence as one of the world’s economic giants”, Anwar wrote on ‘X’ as he bid goodbye, describing the late former PM as “my mitra, my bhai, Manmohan”.


He said he had the privilege of “witnessing the early years of these transformative polices first-hand” when they both served as finance ministers of their countries during the 1990s. “We shared a fervent commitment to the war against corruption — even collaborating to unravel a major case,” Anwar wrote.


Anwar said it was time for people to know why Singh, “as the Bard would have it”, was a “man so full of the milk of human kindness”. He recalled: “During the years of my incarceration, he extended a kindness that he didn’t have to — one that was neither politically expedient nor, as one can imagine, appreciated by the Malaysian govt at that time. Yet, true to his character, he did it anyway. He offered scholarships for my children, particularly my son, Ihsan.” He said though he had declined the offer, “such a gesture undoubtedly showed his extraordinary humanity and generosity…”


“In those dark days, as I navigated the labyrinth of imprisonment, he stood by me as a true friend. Such acts of quiet magnanimity defined him, and they will remain etched in my heart forever,” Anwar, who was imprisoned 1999-2004, wrote.

The Indo-US nuclear deal

Subodh Ghildiyal, Dec 28, 2024: The Times of India

New Delhi : Seen as “docile” and “time server”, Manmohan Singh was supposed to fold up when threatened with the survival of his fortuitous perch of Prime Minister. Then indispensable UPA pillar, the CPM, led by a doctrinaire Prakash Karat, had laid down the red line over the path-breaking Indo-US nuclear deal.


But instead of putting survival over self-respect, Singh defended the deal to the Communist apparatchik in a matter-of-fact chat on August 7, 2007, and defied him to carry out his threat. “If you want to withdraw support, so be it.”


The Left withdrew, a tumultuous numbers game with Communists, BJP “communalists” and Mayawati on the same side, was won and the ‘Deal’ was delivered. And so was a “muscular Manmohan”, who months later led Congress to a big win in the 2009 LS polls to emerge as a leader in his own right. 
Behind Singh’s transition from “meek” to “muscular” was the seminal event that included high policy calculations and sharp political manoeuvrings. In the thick of it was Samajwadi Party, ever eager to join govt and make up for the slight of 1999 when Mulayam Singh Yadav refused to support Sonia Gandhi’s bid to form govt after the fall of Vajpayee govt by one vote. It was also an opportunity for Mulayam to find place on the treasury benches he had failed to secure when Congress and its allies managed enough seats to form govt without his support after the 2004 LS polls.


Singh tied up with Mulayam, known as a China phobe, with Congress managers promising Samajwadis relief from their legal troubles. To make the deal about policy, a briefing on ‘123 agreement’ by NSA M K Narayanan was organised at then Mulayam confidant late Amar Singh’s Lodhi Estate residence.
 The SP crossover changed the numbers’ game, while the opposition bidto trigger defections from govt camp was countered by an equally aggressive counter-attack.


For 12 days, the capital became a hub of meetings and late night huddles, surreptitious contacts and secret offers. Karat had, informally, termed Mayawati’s switch to the “nay” group as a “game changer”. BJP managers threw their all into the attempt to bring down the UPA. And as seen in the Parliament complex on the day of the dramatic vote, the cut-throat exercise had made BJP roll in some of its ailing MPs in ambulances for voting against the Deal.


The clash eventually saw three BJP MPs bring wads of cash in Lok Sabha to claim bribes offered — cash for vote – as it came to be known. But by July 22 evening, “Singh is King” was the buzzword swamping the cacophony of allegations and counter allegations, days after Left pulled out of govt on July 9, 2008.


That was the moment that made Singh more than he was till then known for or capable of. Already a darling of the middle classes for his role in liberalising the economy, he became its mascot as the “strong leader” standing up for the country’s progress and development, to the extent of even risking power.

Legacy

Economic legacy in 5 charts

Dr Singh’s economic legacy in 5 charts
From: Dec 28, 2024: The Times of India

See graphic:

Dr Singh’s economic legacy in 5 charts

C Rangarajan recalls

Dec 28, 2024: The Times of India

My contact with Manmohan Singh goes back to the end of the 1960s when both of us were in New York. He was in the United Nations and I was teaching at New York University. Later on, we started working together in the mid-1980s when he was governor of the Reserve Bank of India and I was a deputy governor.


If you look at his entire career, three important qualities stand out. One is vision, the other is courage and the third is humility. Ideas are needed to move the system forward, but you must have vision. Adequate vision must be supplemented by courage, which we saw in the early 1990s.


The most important aspect of Dr Singh’s actions is the exhibition of both ideas and implementation. The reforms introduced in the early 1990s, and the subsequent actions that he took in the period when he was PM, all indicate this combination of ideas and implementation.


We worked together and there was an exchange of ideas. Even when we differed, we did so politely. He tried to take everybody along with him, and he gave the freedom to discuss freely. Finally, a conclusion was reached in which everybody agreed.


There were occasions when we differed. But that did not come in the way of executing the ideas. There was also the quality of humility in him, which was extraordinary. For aperson who held such important positions, he never rode roughshod over anybody.


For example, in bringing to an end the system of issuing ad-hoc treasury bills, when I mentioned to him how this system acted a way that it resulted in the automatic monetisation of the fiscal deficit, he heard me out and then agreed, even though I did not expect he would agree to it that quickly. But he did, because when he saw the logic, he tried to follow it and implement whatever suggestion was made.


Bringing the issue of these bills to an end could result in the cost of govt borrowing going up. But he was willing to bear it because the underlying principle was correct.


Again, when we moved from the system of dual exchange rate to a system in which the market fully determined the exchange rate, there were many arguments against the move. There were suggestions that we move slowly. But when I discussed it with him, we decided that it was better to move in one step. He once again saw the benefit that comes from a particular action and immediately agreed to implement it.


What he cared for is the benefit to the nation, benefit to society. If that demanded a particular action, he would take that action immediately.


On The 1991 Devaluation:


Originally, a decision was taken to devalue the rupee in two stages. I was in charge of announcing the exchange rate and made the first move.


Before the second move could be made, there were some concerns whether we should devalue the rupee to such an extent. We had discussed the problem thoroughly and a conclusion had been reached and was also communicated to the President. But then the Prime Minister (PV Narasimha Rao) had some concerns on going ahead with the second step. Dr Singh said he would get in touch with me but then he went on saying that he was not able to reach me. By the time he reached me, I’d already “jumped the step”.


If he had backed down at that time, it would have reflected badly on India. Our ability to borrow in the market would have been hinder- ed as it would have been seen as our unwillingness to take appropriate action.


When the decision to devalue the rupee was taken, Dr Singh wrote a cheque and asked for it to be credited to the PM’s Relief Fund. The amount represented difference in rupee value of his assets abroad following the devaluation. That showed how he was not willing to benefit by any decision personally. That shows the man’s character, that his integrity was beyond question.


He certainly managed the system both as the FM and the PM very well. History will remember him as one of the ablest PMs. Between 2005-06 and 2007-08, India had a growth rate in excess of 9%, which is outstanding.


He will be remembered for ushering in efficiency in the system. That is what compelled him to move towards a competitive system. That is an important lesson for a country like India because if we really want to be able to compete in the world, let us say through exports, then efficiency becomes critically important. Without an efficient economic system, we cannot do it.


As told to Surojit Gupta

II

History will be kind to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh

Swaminathan S Anklesaria Aiyar,TNN | May 15, 2014 The Times of India

History will be kind to Manmohan Singh. It will remember him as the finance minister who launched India's economic reforms in 1991, and the Prime Minister who presided over 8.5% GDP growth for most of a decade. It will also remember him as a Sikh who was nominated for Prime Ministership by a Christian Congres president and sworn in by a Muslim President in a country that is 82% Hindu.

[Indpaedia remembers him as the hugely successful economist sworn in by a scientist who was national icon, making India unique in an otherwise politicised world.]

Why will he not be remembered as the man under whom economic growth halved from 9% to 4.5%, inflation averaged almost 10% for five years, and unending scams culminated in the worst-ever electoral defeat for the Congres party? For the same reason that Abraham Lincoln is not remembered for scandalous dirty tricks and bribes to get his way (displayed memorably in the film 'Lincoln' ). Nor is Lincoln remembered as the hypocrite who won the election as a moderate on slavery, arguing that states had a constitutional right to slavery if they so wished, but then declared in 1863 that he had the power to abolish slavery by decree.

Few people know or care about Lincoln's failings: these pale beside his great achievement of abolishing slavery. Similarly, people will forget Manmohan Singh's failings, and remember him as the father of economic reform and superfast growth. This superfast growth persuaded George Bush to offer India a seat in the nuclear club, ending nuclear apartheid. It also persuaded Barack Obama to promise US support to India for a UN Security Council seat. These landmarks will remain in the history books long after the 2G scam is forgotten.

Set aside the history books: let's talk about today, as Singh demits office. Many critics complain that he didn't do enough in 10 years of rule. This criticism is mis-worded since it assumes that Singh has been ruling India, when the unquestioned ruler has been Sonia Gandhi. Formal democratic titles mean nothing in the semi-feudal ethos of the Congres Party. Only the dynasty matters.

This is a party where all members are supposed to sit up and beg when any member of the Gandhi family whistles. Its members have no rationale, purpose or hope of power save through the grace of the Gandhis. Dynastic feudalism is, of course evident in other parties too, like those of Lalu Prasad, Mulayam Singh Yadav, Deve Gowda, Jagan Reddy, Karunanidhi and sundry others. But the Congres has been the pioneer and greatest practitioner of feudal rule. The wazir in a feudal court has some powers, but must know his place in the power structure, or else lose his head.

Manmohan Singh was fully aware of and agreeable to this when he accepted the Prime Ministership. A seasoned bureaucrat, he was used to proposing ideas but retreating respectfully if opposed by his boss. He was ideal for Sonia, a respected technocrat with absolutely no political base or ambitions, who could serve but not threaten the dynasty.

This dynasty has generated more black money than all others combined. It found very useful Singh's unimpeachable reputation for integrity. This provided some cover to the dynasty when scams exploded. But it damaged Singh's own reputation. Remember the scene from the film 'Dabangg' where Malaika Arora dances in front of Salman Khan singing "Munni badnam hui, Darling tere liye?" This inspired a cartoon showing Manmohan Singh dancing in front of Sonia Gandhi, singing "Munna badnam hua, Darling tere liye."

In dynastic terms, Singh should perhaps be judged not as a Prime Minister but as a regent, keeping the throne warm for the young prince, under the watchful gaze of the Dowager Empress. I wrote back in 2005, after his first year as Prime Minister, that his approach could be summed up in Seven Commandments.

• Thou shalt not displease Sonia.

• Thou shalt not displease the Left Front.

• Thou shalt not test the limits of your powers.

• Thou shalt focus on surviving a full term.

• Thou shalt accommodate in the cabinet all criminals who can help this aim.

• Thou shalt at the end of your regency hand over the reins to the true dynastic inheritors.

• Thou shalt, meanwhile, be free to initiate policies that threaten neither the dynasty nor the coalition's survival (such as improving relations with Pakistan and China, and organizing buses to Muzaffarabad).

This was the story of UPA-1 until George Bush offered India membership of the nuclear club. Singh grabbed the offer, and Sonia gave her blessings. On this issue UPA-1 broke with the Left Front, risking defeat in Parliament. This courage paid off. But after victory seemed assured, Manmohan scored a terrible own-goal. He succumbed to opposition pressure by putting the liability for any nuclear mishap on foreign suppliers. Because of this, no nuclear power deals are going ahead at all. A great nuclear initiative has been nullified by cowardice on one clause.

The story of UPA-2 has eerie similarities, with Mamata Banerjee replacing the Left Front as the key force keeping the government alive, but extracting its pound of flesh . Sonia took economic growth for granted, did not listen to Singh's pleadings for further reforms, and switched to the NAC as her chief guide and mentor.

UPA-1 finally broke with the Left Front on the nuclear deal, and UPA-2 broke with Mamata after Moody's threatened to downgrade India's credit rating in 2012. This would have meant an immediate outflow of $100 billion, sinking the economy in the run-up to the 2014 elections. Drastic action was called for.

For the second time, Manmohan Singh took a firm stand and Sonia backed him. At the risk of losing Mamata's support and becoming a minority government, Sonia abandoned the NAC and allowed Singh and Chidambaram to chart a new course. They were asked to boost growth, tame inflation, and enact reforms.

Alas, they failed on all three counts. GDP growth remained at just 4.5%, half the 9% achieved earlier. Consumer price inflation simply did not fall below the 8-10 % range. As for reforms, the new rules for FDI in multi-brand retail were so loaded with cumbersome clauses that they have not yielded much investment. The subsidy on diesel was supposed to be phased out, but the crash in the rupee last year raised the import price, so the diesel subsidy today remains as high as ever. The Cabinet Committee on Investment cleared stuck projects worth Rs 6 lakh crore, yet this did not translate into any boom in orders for capital goods or construction contracts.

Why? Because a new licencepermit raj had come up unnoticed. The old licence raj was based on industrial licences, import licences and forex controls. The new licence raj was based on the environment, forests, tribal areas ad land acquisition. A veritable jungle of new controls in these areas was created at central and state levels. Initially, these new barriers were overcome by bribes. But once public anger exploded over corruption, clearances could not be bought, and the impenetrable nature of the new controls became evident. Judicial activism made bureaucrats wary of taking any decisions.

Singh and Chidambaram claim that things would have been much worse but for their efforts. Maybe, but that is hardly a winning election platform. For most of his 10 years, Singh was feted for his economic skills and integrity. He leaves office amidst economic travails and the smell of corruption.

Can he take solace in the fact that in his last six months, foreign money has flooded into India, the rupee has strengthened, and the stock markets have boomed. Alas, no. The sad fact is that they are booming because of the expectation that he will soon be replaced by Modi.

Singh started with two years of 8.5% growth and ended with two years of 4.5% growth. If only it had been the other way round! However, political careers rarely end on a cheerful note, as can be testified by his predecessors — Vajpayee, Gujral, Deve Gowda, Narasimha Rao, VP Singh, Rajiv Gandhi.

However, people are ultimately judged not by their failures but for their career achievements. Virender Sehwag, for instance, had to be ousted from the Indian cricket team after two years of bad performance, just like Singh. But the history books will record that Sehwag was India's highest scoring opening batsman ever. His later failures cannot eclipse his heroic feats in his glory days. The same will be true of Manmohan Singh.

Sonia Gandhi and he

1

Manoj C G, Dec 28, 2024: The Indian Express

“Throughout these past six years that I have been in politics, one thing has been clear to me. And that is, as I have often stated, that the post of Prime Minister is not my aim. I was always certain that if ever I found myself in the position that I am in today, I would follow my own inner voice. Today, that voice tells me I must humbly decline this post,” Sonia Gandhi stunned the Congress and the political world with these words in May 2004, opening a new chapter in Indian politics which saw the elevation of Manmohan Singh as PM.

While what prompted Gandhi to decline the top post is still a mystery to many, Natwar Singh, once a 10, Janpath insider, claimed in his autobiography that she refused to become the PM because of pressure from her son, Rahul, who feared for her life. Party insiders also say that once she had made up her mind to decline the post, Gandhi always had the soft-spoken and scholarly Singh in mind for it.

Former President Pranab Mukherjee too was then speculated to be in the race, but he knew his turn would not come, that Sonia would prefer Singh. In her book Pranab My Father – A Daughter Remembers, Mukherjee’s daughter Sharmishta recalled a conversation she had with her father. “Following Sonia’s decision to withdraw from the prime ministerial race, there was intense speculation within the media and political spheres. The names of Dr Manmohan Singh and Pranab were being discussed as the top contenders for the position. I did not have the chance to meet Baba for a couple of days as he was terribly busy, but I spoke to him over the phone. I asked him excitedly if he was going to become the PM. His response was blunt, ‘No, she will not make me the PM’. It’ll be Manmohan Singh,” she wrote.

However, Singh’s 10 years as PM saw his government and the party headed by Gandhi pulling in different directions at times. Adding to the perception of drift and rift was the extra constitutional National Advisory Council (NAC) headed by Gandhi and comprising civil society activists and academics.

She and the NAC, which was accused of acting like a super Cabinet, were often seen as undermining Singh’s authority and that of the Prime Minister’s Office, a charge both Singh and Gandhi publicly denied. Despite this, the economist PM displayed amazing dexterity in marrying the NAC’s socialist and welfarist discourse with his free market outlook.

Years later, Singh’s former media advisor Sanjaya Baru adjudged the power-sharing model between Singh as PM and Gandhi as party chief in his book The Accidental Prime Minister: The Making and Unmaking of Manmohan Singh as: “While power was delegated, authority was not.”

Baru quoted Singh as telling him: “You see, you must understand one thing. I have come to terms with this. There cannot be two centres of power. That creates confusion. I have to accept that the party president is the centre of power. The government is answerable to the party.”

Singh’s Cabinet was also marked by stories of rifts. Some of the leaders, both in the party and the Ministry, despised the NAC members and sympathized with the PM. They talked about key files being taken to 10, Janpath, for approval; about the NAC writing to ministers and seeking compliance reports on its recommendations and proposals. The perception was that Singh was not entirely happy, as he had no role in the NAC set-up.

Others, ready to bend over backwards to please Gandhi, rushed to defend her saying she was only briefed on policy matters as the party president.

The perception of this “weak” PM gained further strength when Natwar Singh, who was a minister in the UPA I government but had to resign after the Volcker report on alleged fraud in the Oil-for-Food programme for war-torn Iraq, claimed in his book that official files were routinely carried by PMO official Pulok Chatterjee to Gandhi.

Neither was the party entirely pleased with the PM for putting the government on the line on the Indo-US nuclear deal. A Left leader who was a key part of the intense faceoff and hard-nosed negotiations between the government on the issue revealed in private that they were given to understand by Gandhi that the situation would not come to a breakdown. However, she was also clear that it was Singh who would take the final call – and he did.

That is perhaps why after the 2009 unexpected poll win following the nuclear deal high, Gandhi continued with Singh as PM and chose Mukherjee for the post of President. In one of his memoirs, Mukherjee wrote about Gandhi telling him on June 2, 2012, that he was most eminently suited for the high office of the President, but that he had a crucial role to play in the functioning of the UPA government. In fact, he wrote, Gandhi also asked him to suggest an alternative name as the UPA’s presidential nominee.

“I returned with a vague impression that she might wish to consider Manmohan Singh as the UPA presidential nominee. I thought that if she selected Singh for the presidential office, she may choose me as the prime minister. I had heard a rumour that she had given this formulation serious thought,” Mukherjee wrote.

Their difficult power-sharing notwithstanding, Gandhi and Singh shared immense mutual respect. That warmth and camaraderie remained intact even after the Congress’s humiliating defeat in 2014, which was largely because of the massive anger against the UPA II government led by Singh.

One reason surely was that Gandhi was mindful of the bad press she had received over the way P V Narasimha Rao was sidelined by the Congress after his term as PM ended, and how he was humiliated even in death.

Gandhi ensured that the blame for the 2014 poll rout did not fall squarely on Singh. He remained a member of the Rajya Sabha till April this year.

In 2018, at an India Today Conclave in Mumbai, Gandhi was asked why she gave up the chance to become PM in 2004 and named Singh. “I knew my limitations,” she said. “I knew Manmohan Singh would be a better PM than me.”

The extent of his administrative autonomy

Sonia chose FM without consulting PM, gave instructions on key files’

Manmohan Had Little Hold Over Cabinet, Claims Book

TIMES NEWS NETWORK The Times of India

The Times of India

Freedom to choose cabinet, own principal aides

After the Congres’s electoral victory in 2009, PM Manmohan Singh made “the cardinal mistake of imagining the victory was his. Bit by bit, in the space of a few weeks he was defanged. He thought he could induct the ministers he wanted. Sonia nipped that hope in the bud by offering the finance portfolio to Pranab (Mukherjee), without even consulting him,” reveals a new book by Sanjaya Baru, who was media adviser to the PM in UPA-1. Singh had apparently been keen to appoint his principal economic adviser C Rangarajan, “the comrade with whom he had battled the balance of payments crisis of 1991-92”, as finance minister.

Singh had opposed A Raja’s induction in the Cabinet, but caved in after 24 hours

Indo-US nuclear deal

Baru claims that when it seemed the Congres would cave in to the Left on the nuclear deal with the US, a dejected Singh told a couple of confidants, “She (Sonia) has let me down.”

Manmohan Singh said, “She (Sonia) has let me down” over the India-US nuclear deal. Later, he offered to quit Singh told Sanjaya Baru he accepted “the party president is the centre of power” Congres made sure all credit for initiatives like NREGA went to the Gandhis

Interestingly, Baru claims that Sitaram Yechury was supportive of the amended version of the nuclear deal but was helpless in the face of Prakash Karat’s refusal to budge accept the deal. When the PM was informed that the Left would not back the agreement, he was furious.

Manmohan Singh was prepared to 'Call It Off'

Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Manmohan Singh Told Team To 'Call It Off', Says Former Aide| Lalit K Jha PTI

Manmohan Singh told his team to "call off" the Indo-US civil nuclear deal a night before its scheduled announcement by President George Bush after Americans came with a killer proposal to let India have just two of its nuclear reactors out of the international safeguards, a top aide of the former Prime Minister has said.

Such a disclosure by former national security advisor M K Narayanan was made here yesterday after former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told a Washington audience that then Prime Minister Singh called off the deal a night before its scheduled announcement on July 18, 2005, because the opposition parties in India were up in arms against it.

"I just wanted to set the record straight. I know that a view has been widely propounded that on the night of the July 17/18, Manmohan Singh had called off the deal. I think there were very valid reasons," Narayanan said in his clarification issued during a day-long conference on the 10th anniversary of the landmark civil nuclear deal.

"There was an understanding which had been reached (by the Prime Minister's Office) with the (US) President?s office that the number of Indian reactors that would be kept out of the international safeguards would be number such and such," he said at the event organised by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Confederation of Indian Industry.

"The (US) State Department had a lot of people who wanted to teach India a lesson. By the time the visit was due, the number that was agreed on six to eight was reduced to two.

That was the figure that was totally unacceptable from the point of view of the Ministry of External Affairs," Narayanan said describing the sequence of events on the night of June 17/18 when Singh was visiting the United States.

"And therefore the position that night was the Prime Ministers words, which I might use, at 12.05 if the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Security Advisor are not willing to go along with the figure, let's call it off and then we will," Narayanan said.

Such a decision by the Prime Minister sent a strong message to the Americans. As the news reached the White House, Bush sent Rice to Willard Hotel where Singh was staying.

According to Narayanan, the prime minister did not want to meet Rice at this point of time as he would not prefer to share this bad news directly.

Rice met the then External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh who then took Rice to the suit of the Prime Minister. Once the Americans agreed on a figure that was acceptable to Indians, the Prime Minister gave his go ahead for the deal, he said.

"I want history to record that this deal would not have gone through from the Indian side without Manmohan Singh being 150 per cent for the deal," Narayanan said.

Later participating in a panel discussion along with three other former national security advisors from the two countries ? Stephen Headley, Tom Donilon and Shivshankar Menon ? Narayanan said?it was what he called the "suspension of disbelieve" which was the reasons for the two countries to be able to get the civil nuclear deal done.

Authority over his own Cabinet

The PM seemed to have had little authority over his own Cabinet. “No one in Singh’s council of ministers seemed to feel that he owed his position, rank or portfolio to him. The final word always was that of leaders of the parties constituting the UPA,” says the book.

According to Sanjaya Baru, former media adviser to the PM, Congres MPs “did not see loyalty to the PM as a political necessity, nor did Dr Singh seek loyalty in the way. Sonia and her aides sought it.”

It adds that Singh often faced challenges while dealing with senior Congres ministers like Arjun Singh, A K Antony and the “presumed PM-in-waiting” Pranab Mukherjee. “Each had a mind of his own and each was conscious of his political status and rank”.

According to Baru, Singh shared a good working equation with finance minister P Chidambaram in UPA-I. He would insist that Chidambaram sit with him and finalize the budget speech. In contrast, his relationship with Pranab Mukherjee was far more formal. Mukherjee would apparently not even show Singh the draft of the budget speech till he had finished writing it. When he was external affairs minister, he would also ‘forget’ to brief the PM on important meetings with US President George W Bush and then secretary of state Condoleezza Rice.

The book also claims that Singh had tried to resist the induction of DMK's A Raja well before the 2G scam became public knowledge. “But after asserting himself for a full twenty-four hours, (he) caved in to pressure from both his own party and the DMK.”

All important files were shown to Mrs Sonia Gandhi?

Baru claims that Pulok Chatterjee, who served in the PMO in UPA-1 and is now principal secretary to the PM, would have “regular, almost daily meetings with Sonia Gandhi in which he was said to brief her... and seek her instructions on the important files to be cleared by the PM.”

The silent PM

For years, Singh's stoic silence has made him the target of many unkind remarks. But the secrecy shrouding his functioning – and his relationship with Congres chief Sonia Gandhi – has now been breached by a man he had handpicked. While offering the job to Baru, Singh had requested him to be “his eyes and ears”.

Baru’s book, ‘The Accidental Prime Minister’ paints a picture of a PM who decided to “surrender” to the party boss and the UPA allies. According to Baru, Sonia’s “renunciation of power was more a political tactic than a response to a higher calling”.

Much of what Baru — who served between 2004 and 2008 — has written has been long heard on the Capital’s political grapevine, but this is the first time an insider has spilled the beans quite so candidly.

Two power centres: PM and Chairperson

On the question of a ‘diarchy’ or two power centres, Baru says there was no such confusion in Singh’s mind. He quotes Singh as having told him, “I have to accept that the party president is the centre of power. The government is answerable to the party.”

Baru claims that there was an eagerness to claim all social development programmes as the Sonia Gandhi-chaired National Advisory Council's initiatives, even though the Bharat Nirman programme came out of the PMO -- drafted by the late R Gopalakrishnan, who was joint secretary.

He also claims that on September 26, 2007 — Manmohan Singh's 75th birthday — Rahul Gandhi led a delegation of general secretaries to wish him. Rahul wanted to extend NREGA to all 500 rural districts in the country. Baru sent a text message to a journalist that this was the PM's birthday gift to the country. When he was summoned by the PM, he apparently told Singh, “You and Raghuvansh Prasad (then minister for rural development) deserve as much credit.” The PM snapped: “I do not want any credit for myself... Let them take all the credit. I don't need it. I am only doing my work.”

Wanting to resign

The book also reveals that Singh had threatened to quit if the UPA buckled under Left pressure and had told Sonia Gandhi to look for his replacement. Even as rumours circulated that Pranab Mukherjee or Sushil Kumar Shinde might be considered as his replacement, the NCP backed him, with Praful Patel telling Baru they would not support anyone but “Doctor Saheb”.

Sonia reportedly asked Montek Singh Ahluwalia, deputy chairman of the Planning Commission, to convince the PM not to resign. She also visited Singh at his residence with Pranab Mukherjee. The government was then allowed to proceed with the deal. However, such shows of resolve from Singh were not forthcoming in UPA-II. Baru cites his own case when the PM wanted to reappoint him as a secretary in the PMO in 2009. However, he had to drop the plan as he was told that the party was opposed to such a move. “To tell the truth, I was dismayed by the PM's display of spinelessness,” writes Baru.

The top officers of the Prime Minister’s Office

TKA NAIR

TKA NAIR WAS NOT SINGH’S FIRST CHOICE

(TKA) Nair was not Dr Singh’s first choice for the allimportant post of principal secretary. He had hoped to induct NN Vohra, who had given me the news of my job... Vohra even cancelled a scheduled visit to London to be able to join the PMO. Sonia Gandhi had another retired IAS officer, a Tamilian whose name I am not at liberty to disclose, in mind for the job. He had worked with Rajiv Gandhi and was regarded as a capable and honest official. However, he declined Sonia’s invitation to rejoin government on a matter of principle—he had promised his father that he would never seek a government job after retirement... Always impeccably attired, Nair, small-built and short, lacked the presence of Brajesh Mishra, whose striking demeanour commanded attention. He rarely gave expression to a clear or bold expression on file, always signing off with a ‘please discuss’ and preferring to give oral instructions to junior officials such as joint secretaries and deputy secretaries

MK Narayanan

PM WAS WARY OF NARAYANAN’S REPUTATION

Dr Singh too was wary of (MK) Narayanan’s reputation and would, on occasion, warn me to be cautious while carrying out sensitive assignments for him that he did not want anyone to know about

Pulok

PULOK INDUCTED INTO PMO AT SONIA’S BEHEST

Pulok, like Nair, suffered from the handicap that his own service had never regarded him as one of its bright sparks. A serving IAS officer, he had never worked in any important ministry... Pulok, who was inducted into the Manmohan Singh PMO at the behest of Sonia Gandhi, had regular, almost daily, meetings with Sonia at which he was said to brief her on the key policy issues of the day and seek her instructions on important files to be cleared by the PM

FIGHT BETWEEN MANI DIXIT AND MK

Mani and Narayanan, just two years apart in age, would often explode into angry arguments in the presence of the PM. On one occasion, Narayanan shouted at Mani: ‘You are a diplomat, who knows a lot about the world but knows nothing about India.’ Mani countered by asking Narayanan what he thought he knew about the country, considering he had never done ‘a good police officer’s job’...Dr Singh would sit through such altercations with a worried look. But on one occasion, it got bit too much for even a man as patient as him. While Mani and Narayanan were arguing vociferously in his presence, each accusing the other of overstepping his bounds, Dr Singh first kept quiet, then got up abruptly, looking visibly irritated

ON HOW ANU AGA WAS NOT MADE A PLAN PANEL MEMBER

The one name I was asked to sound out was Anu Aga, chairperson of Thermax. Her husband Rohinton Aga had been a contemporary of Dr Singh at college in England and she had distinguished herself as a corporate leader when she took charge of the family company after his death. When I called Anu, who was then in London, she asked for a day to consult her family. She called the next day and accepted Dr Singh’s invitation to join the Planning Commission. But when I went back to him with her acceptance, the PM looked sheepish and informed me that he had already agreed to appoint Syeda Hameed, a Muslim writer and social activist, and, so, I was told, there was no place left for Anu. I was left with the embarrassing task of explaining away the confusion to Anu... To my dismay, even Dr Singh seemed to take this embarrassment lightly

Narasimha Rao’s cremation

SONIA DIDN’T WANT RAO MEMORIAL IN DELHI

From Sanjaya Baru’s book:

I had very little to do with (Ahmed) Patel and during the few times we interacted he was always warm and friendly. I only had two substantive conversations with him during my time at the PMO. The first occurred shortly after Narasimha Rao died...Narasimha Rao’s children wanted the former PM to be cremated in Delhi, like other Congres Prime Ministers... However, Patel wanted me to encourage Narasimha Rao’s sons, Ranga and Prabhakar, and his daughter Vani to take their father’s body to Hyderabad for cremation. Clearly, it seemed to me, Sonia didn’t want a memorial for Rao anywhere in Delhi

CEA Kaushik Basu’s anti-corruption plan

Kaushik Basu, July 6, 2021: The Times of India

(February 5, 2011)

There are three kinds of politicians. Those who take money for themselves, those who take money as karma, for the sake of their political party, and those who do not take. While I have never seen an incidence of bribery in my presence in the government I am of course aware that it happens; and for the politicians with whom I interact, I feel I can guess which of the three categories each of them belongs to. I have utter disrespect and disdain for the first group: those who are corrupt and take bribes to enrich themselves, their family and friends. I have huge respect for the last group. And though I have distaste for the ones who take money for their party and to compete in elections, there is a problem in morally categorising them. If they want their party to win with genuine good intentions for the welfare of the masses and money is essential to run election campaigns, what choice do they have? It is a systemic problem instead of a problem of individual moral failing. How one views such persons depends on whether one is a moral consequentialist or a believer in deontological ethics.

I usually consider myself to be a consequentialist but in recent times have had some dilemma.

There is another genuine problem with corruption control, especially in countries where corruption is pervasive. Many a political leader comes to power genuinely wanting to curb corruption. On getting elected they soon realise that corruption being widespread, they have an embarrassment of choices. Who should they arrest, since they cannot arrest all? Political instinct tells a leader that it is better to pick up those who oppose him instead of his friends. Soon corruption control becomes an instrument of political oppression, to harass opponents and media personalities who criticise him. This has happened time and again in the world. We have to put our minds to thinking about how to change this.

(April 23, 2011)

In recent times I have created a lot of controversy by proposing an idea for amending India’s Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The idea is simple. By the Indian law, the giver and taker of bribes are both considered liable. I suggested that for certain kinds of bribes, where one has to give a bribe for something that is legitimate, the bribe giver should not be punished. Only the government servant taking the bribe should be treated as liable. My argument was simple. In the present situation, the bribe taker knows that after giving the bribe the bribe giver will collude with the taker to hide the fact of bribery, since otherwise both will go to jail. By making bribe giving legal, this post-bribery collusion will be disrupted. And knowing this, the bribe taker will be more hesitant to take the bribe in the first place. So corruption will decline. Much turmoil had been created with the posting of my paper with this proposal on the Ministry of Finance’s website, and this continued to simmer, with occasional calls for me to be asked to resign from the government.

As part of this continuing interest in the topic, I had Barkha Dutt’s office calling me repeatedly today, asking me to appear on her television show, ‘We the People’, the next morning, where I could explain my corruption idea and have it debated. When I finally took the call, Barkha insisted and said mine was an important idea that deserves to be discussed. I was in a dilemma. I like Barkha and I do not mind being attacked in debates. However, I was acutely aware that I had caused the government a lot of grief with the posting of my idea. Recently, newspapers reported that Communist Party member of Parliament, D Raja, had written to the prime minister, complaining about me and my ‘immoral’ idea. A copy of the letter dated April 23, 2011 addressed to the prime minister, with a cc to the finance minister, not only described my suggestion for the amendment as morally flawed but also faulty as ‘economic reasoning’, though he gave no reason to explain why my reasoning was faulty. The letter ended asking for my paper to be taken down from the ministry’s website. There was also a letter, dated April 21, written by S Sudhakar Reddy, former MP and deputy general secretary of the Communist Party of India, addressed to the finance minister. He also asked for the paper to be removed from the Finance Ministry’s portal and went further and asked for a ‘detailed probe into the real motives’ for my posting the article.

Others also had written to the finance minister that my paper should be taken down from the ministry’s website. I was disappointed by the members of the Communist Party getting so upset by my idea. In India, the communists are generally the more cerebral politicians. It was sad to see that instead of engaging with my interesting idea they were giving in to knee-jerk politics.

I decided that if the FM or the PM asked me to take it down, I would of course do so. They had the right to order me to do so and as a civil servant I was obliged to obey the order. However, I had the right to resign from my job, and I would do so too. To the great credit of Pranab Mukherjee and Manmohan Singh, they made no such request. They had been good to me and so, hesitating whether I would stir the debate by appearing on television on this, I thought I would do what I hated to do: ask their advice on whether I should appear and try to clarify my thoughts on corruption control.

I told Barkha I would call her back soon and hung up. I learned that the finance minister was away in Vietnam. So I called the prime minister’s residence and said that I wanted to talk to Dr Singh. Within ten minutes the prime minister called back. I asked him if he had advice for me about whether I should appear on Barkha’s programme on corruption control and risk stirring the pot. This was the first time I was talking to him directly about my corruption paper, though we had been going back and forth through intermediaries as the controversy brewed.

Manmohan Singh began by saying that he had of course received the complaints about my idea from members of Parliament and read some of the newspaper reports, though he had not read my paper on the Finance Ministry website. He went on to add that on the basis of what he had read, he did not agree with the amendment to India’s corruption control law that I had proposed. I tried to gently defend my proposal but he sounded adamant that he disagreed with me. Beyond a point, how much can you argue with the prime minister and so I kept quiet, expecting him to say that I should stay off the debate and let the idea die a natural death.

But what he said next caught me by surprise. He comforted me by saying controversy was a part of political life, so I should not be perturbed. Then he added that though he disagreed with my idea and it was causing him political difficulty, that did not mean that I should not speak about it. The role of an adviser is to bring ideas to the table, even if they are controversial. So I should feel free to appear on Barkha Dutt’s programme. The decision, he said, was mine.

On putting down the phone, I called Barkha’s office and declined. This was a remarkable experience for me. It showed up a side of the prime minister which was quite extraordinary. It takes a quiet courage (not the school yard bully’s behavior, which many voters mistakenly equate with courage) to give others the space that he gave me.

Excerpted with permission from Policymaker’s Journal: From New Delhi to Washing ton DC (published by Simon & Schuster India)

Siachen

PM's ex-aide Sanjaya Baru blames ‘hawkish’ Antony, Army for scuttling Manmohan Singh's Siachen initiative, Gen JJ Singh hits back

Rajat Pandit,TNN | Apr 12, 2014

NEW DELHI: It's well-known that PM Manmohan Singh was very keen to convert Siachen into "a mountain of peace" after visiting the forbidding glacial heights in June 2005. But the Indian defence establishment was equally adamant that Pakistan would have to first authenticate the relative troop positions before any withdrawal from the Siachen Glacier-Saltoro Ridge.

Indian soldiers, after all, controlled almost all the dominating heights, ranging from 16,000 to 22,000-feet, on the Saltoro Ridge region. But with Pakistan unwilling to give ironclad guarantees on existing troop positions, the PM's dream slowly ebbed away and perished.

The PM's media adviser during UPA-I, Sanjaya Baru, has now set the cat among the pigeons by holding that Manmohan Singh's peace initiative for the world's highest and coldest battlefield was effectively torpedoed by the "hawkish" position of defence minister AK Antony, as also his predecessor Pranab Mukherjee, as well as the then Army chief General JJ Singh.

"I was never sure whether Antony's hawkish stance was because he genuinely disagreed with the Siachen initiative or whether he was merely toeing a Nehru-Gandhi family line that would not allow Dr Singh to be the one finally normalizing relations with Pakistan. After all, the Kashmir problem had its roots in Nehru's policies ... I felt Sonia would want to wait till Rahul became PM so that he could claim credit," writes Baru, in his new book "The Accidental Prime Minister".

Both Mukerjee and Antony, as successive defence ministers in UPA-I, were not enthusiastic about a deal on Siachen, though Sonia had "blessed"" the peace formula. Moreover, the PM also had to contend with "a declining quality" in military leadership. "In closed-door briefings, the general would say that a deal with Pakistan was doable, but in public he would back Antony when the defence minister chose not to back the PM," says Baru.

Gen Singh, who was the Army chief from 2005 to 2007 and Arunachal Pradesh governor till last year, hit back on Saturday. "What does he (Baru) know? What are his qualifications to pass such sweeping judgements and make disparaging statements on the military leadership? Does he have any idea what leadership is all about?" said Gen Singh, talking to TOI.

Dismissing Baru's knowledge of classified matters, Gen Singh said the military had given "perfectly sound advice" to the PM on the Siachen imbroglio. "We said unless Pakistan authenticates the troop positions, both on the ground and maps, there was no question of any withdrawal," the former Army chief said.

And even if Pakistan agreed to this pre-condition, the disengagement and demilitarization of the Siachen could only be done in a phased manner. "If Pakistan tried to indulge in some misadventure (to take the heights), the response and reaction time of our troops would have to be factored in. I am happy India's continues with the same stand," said Gen Singh.

Daman Singh on father Manmohan Singh

I

Manmohan is funny, gave nicknames to people: Daughter

Daman Singh charts the journey of her parents in her book "Strictly Personal: Manmohan and Gursharan".

The Times of India

Manmohan Singh had joined a pre-medical course as his father wanted him to become a doctor but pulled out after a couple of months, losing interest in the subject, according to a book on the former prime minister by his daughter.

Daman Singh charts the journey of her parents in her book "Strictly Personal: Manmohan and Gursharan", providing new insights into the couple but keeps away from the last 10 years when Singh was heading the UPA government.

She also finds her father to be a funny man saying he has a good sense of humour.

In April 1948, Singh was admitted to Khalsa College in Amritsar.

"Since his father wanted him to become a doctor, he joined the two-year FSc course that would lead to further studies in medicine. After just a couple of months, he dropped out. He had lost interest in becoming a doctor. In fact, he had also lost interest in studying science," Daman writes.

"I didn't have the time to think," the author, who based her book on conversations with her parents and hours spent in libraries and archives, quotes her father as saying.

"I went and joined my father in his shop. I didn't like that either, because I was not treated as an equal. I was treated as an inferior person who ran errands - bringing water, bringing tea. Then I thought I must go back to college. And I entered Hindu College in September 1948," Singh recalls.

Economics was a subject that appealed to him immediately. "I was always interested in issues of poverty, why some countries are poor, why others are rich. And I was told that economics is the subject which asks these questions," Singh tells his daughter.

While studying at Cambridge University, money was the only real problem that bothered Singh, the book, published by HarperCollins India, says.

"His tuition and living expenses came to about 600 pounds a year. The Panjab University scholarship gave him about 160 pounds. For the rest he had to depend on his father. Manmohan was careful to live very stingily. Subsidised meals in the dining hall were relatively cheap at two shillings sixpence," Daman writes.

Former PM Manmohan Singh with Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper. (Reuters file photo)

She says her father never ate out, and seldom indulged in beer or wine yet he would be in crisis if money from home fell short or did not arrive on time.

"When this happened, he skipped meals or got by on a sixpence bar of Cadbury's chocolate," she says.

He also asked a friend to lend him 25 pounds for two years but the friend could send only 3 pounds.

Daman found her father a very funny man. "When in a reflective mood, he sat with an index finger perched on the side of his nose. He was completely helpless about the house and could neither boil an egg, nor switch on the television."

He also had a sense of humour of sorts, she says. "This was evident when he was with friends, even if they were economists. It was comforting to know that he could laugh and crack jokes as well. With us, he rarely did either.

"The lighter side of him is that he liked to give nicknames to people. Unknown to them, one of our uncles was 'John Babu', another was 'Jewel Babu' and a third - to commemorate his pointed turban - was 'Chunj Waley'. My mother was 'Gurudev', and the three of us were 'Kick', Little Noan' and 'Little Ram'. Some of the other names he coined were less charitable," Daman writes.

According to the author, during his college years Singh read voraciously and the broad seep of his reading covered theological critique, social commentary and political ideology.

"Modern Punjabi literature was a special interest and he read in Gurmukhi as well as in Urdu."

Croquet was the most strenuous game he tried his hand at while he was at Cambridge.

He neither rowed nor punted. But he did watch a fair amount of cricket, particularly when Swaranjit Singh, a burly off-spinner who played cricket for the university team 'Light Blues', was on the field. In the company of friends, he would go for the occasional movie at the Arts Theatre, or else to a pub for the odd pint of beer, she says.

Daman says as a public servant, somewhere along the way her father retreated from family affairs and allowed his work to take over his life.

"Every day his office accompanied him home in big cloth bundles that we helped lug out of the car.

"He worked in bed where he sat cross-legged with a pillow on his lap, a stack of files beside him. As he hunched over his papers, inscribing neat squiggles, he would tug his beard and mutter to himself. When he was not working, he was usually preoccupied with a book or else with his thoughts," she says.

II

Dad faced a lot of resistance from within Congres, Manmohan Singh's daughter Daman says

Sagarika Ghose | Aug 5, 2014

The Times of India

At a time when Manmohan Singh's prime ministership has come under the scanner from the books of Sanjaya Baru and Natawar Singh, the former PM's daughter Daman Singh has sprung to her father's defence with her own book, "Strictly Personal, Manmohan and Gursharan". She says her father is not a manipulative politician or a wheeler-dealer.

In an exclusive interview with TOI ahead of the release of her book, Daman reveals many aspects of Manmohan Singh's life. Excerpts:

Manmohan Singh didn't believe in 2009 that Congres was going to win a second term

Daman: Yes he said that in a casual moment. I didn't probe it. But he said that no, no I don't think we are coming back. He seemed to believe so, although it was said in a light hearted way.

The relationship between Manmohan Singh and Narasimha Rao?

Daman: My father got a call from him and overnight he was the FM. He had a month to present the Budget. The economy was in a ghastly mess. Narasimha Rao made it all happen. Without him, my father could not have done anything. The ideas and radical approach came from my father, but it was Rao who made it politically feasible. My father always says it was a minority government that changed the course of India's entire economic policy. My father felt if he had five more years he could have done more.

My father says it is difficult to change things in India unless the system breaks down completely because in a large democracy its only when things reach breaking point that people are willing to change the system. You can't impose radical change from above. There was a lot of resistance to reforms from within the Congres party, he had to constantly explain to people what he was doing. The whole process was very difficult. Narasimha Rao had to steer the party through it.

Was Manmohan Singh attacked from within because he tried to bring change?

Daman: C Subramaniam was someone greatly admired by my father. I discovered while writing my book that Subramaniam pushed the green revolution, but at the political level he was called an agent of America. Radical change is hard to bring about. Subramaniam lost his seat. Pioneers don't get rewarded, pioneers are never remembered.

Was Manmohan Singh unsuited for politics?

Daman: I don't think he is a misfit in politics but manipulative politics does not come to him easily. He's not a wheeler dealer. But he survived, didn't he? Against all odds, against all the doomsayers he survived. He's not a reluctant politician. He enjoys a challenge, he takes risks and does not play safe. In fact, my father is a risk taker.

In 1991, the question was not about joining politics but on whether to become FM or not. Politics came along with the job, it's not as if he joined politics and then got the job. He took an enormous risk in 1991, he risked his entire life's reputation on economic reforms. 1991 was like a war situation.

Has Manmohan Singh’s reputation has been damaged by revelations in the books of Sanjaya Baru and Natwar Singh?

Daman: I haven't read either of the two books. They're not the sort of books I normally read. As far as I can tell Natwar's book is about politics which is not the kind of book am normally interested in reading. I am interested in politics as a process. I wrote this book because I wanted to discover my parents as individuals. And I think they enjoyed talking to me about their life, and reflecting on different parts of their life.

My mother is the power beside him rather than behind him. She's a people person and she has looked after him all her life. Work drives my father, he's a workaholic. Whether FM or RBI governor, he enjoyed all his posts. He had no regrets.

2005-2009 had not given Manmohan Singh’s family anything to laugh about?

Daman: Being PM was a massive responsibility, the amount of stress in a routine situation was enormous. He became PM under some unusual circumstances and he had to hit the ground running. It wasn't something he had been prepared for. The task was more difficult for him than it would be for anybody else ... the suddenness of it. Within days he had put together a team and get the policy framework moving. Then the coalition government had its own challenges. Being a civil servant gives you an insight on how policies are made, how they function, gives you access to information, knowledge, chance to observe how things work but when you are in charge that's an entirely different cup of tea, the responsibility, initiative, so much of it comes from you as one person, aside from of course the entire government machinery.

Did any member of his family ever want him to resign as PM when things got controversial, with all the scams and accusations?

Daman: We may have had our private thoughts but the lines between the political and the personal are very clear in the family. So we never really voiced anything. But we did worry a lot.

It's said the family wanted Manmohan Singh to resign when Rahul forced the cabinet to roll back the ordinance on criminal MPs?

Daman: My father was travelling when it happened, he was in the US. Of course, he was bothered. But that doesn't mean he had to show it. It's not as if he didn't see or hear what was being said about him. A lot of things bothered him. He is as sensitive as you or I. He just doesn't think it necessary to broadcast his feelings.

Did all the accusations and criticisms get to him and hurt the family?

Daman: Even as FM my father experienced an enormous amount of criticism - personal, professional and political. His family has been brought in, his daughters have been brought in that they work in American think tanks, etc. He's weathered it. He has the ability not let it affect him. But I feel very bad about it. I don't read newspapers or TV, I just switch off. But it would get to my son in school and it was very hurtful.

Didn't Manmohan Singh, the economist PM, in the end, fail to create the economy he would have wanted to?

Daman: Since 1981 my father was pushing growth oriented economics. He's never given up. People say he's worked in WB and IMF and my first reaction is get your facts right, he's ever worked in those places. That bothered me. The fact that people said he was toeing the IMF line never bothered me. But he always believed in growth as a way to alleviate poverty and he always knew what he was doing and I am glad he did it. In a specific context he did not go along with the radical shift of Jagdish Bhagwati and Padma Desai, but then the context changed. When he was FM there was need for a radical shift and he carried it out.

Manmohan Singh seemed to have a lot of respect for Indira Gandhi

Daman: Indira Gandhi inspired his respect, based on his personal interaction with her. She was a power house and she spoke to him as an equal. He was a little known civil servant, yet she heard his ideas, took his advice.

Manmohan Singh may have been hurt with Rajiv Gandhi's remark that the Planning Commission was a bunch of jokers

Daman: He wasn't there when it was said. There were a lot of reports in the media that it was directed at my father. Maybe it was a casual remark.

Did Manmohan Singh feel helpless about corruption in the system?

Daman: I spoke to my father a lot about corruption when I was writing this book. He said after he left Delhi School of Economics and entered the ministry of foreign trade, the then minister had a reputation for being corrupt. But my father said without evidence I cannot put a label on him. I thought that was significant. Later on, HM Patel, who my father admired a lot, was falsely accused, humiliated and he resigned from the civil service. My father had a great deal of regret that such a fine civil servant was subjected to this. My father often said the political system does create corruption, elections need money.

With Narasimha Rao

Narasimha Rao ‘told Manmohan he would be sacked if things didn’t work out well’

PTI | Aug 18, 2014 The Times of India

Woken up from his sleep to be informed of the "out of the blue" decision of his appointment as India's finance minister in 1991, Dr Manmohan Singh was jokingly told by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao that he would be sacked if "things didn't work out well".

Singh was asleep when PC Alexander, principal secretary to the Prime Minister, rang him up frantically to convey Rao's decision to appoint him as finance minister.

"The decision was out of the blue", Singh is quoted as having said by his daughter Daman Singh in her book "Strictly Personal: Manmohan and Gursharan", which covers the years prior to his becoming the Prime Minister in 2004. The book is based on Daman's conversations with her parents and hours spent in libraries and archives.

According to Singh, Rao's most important role was that he allowed the process of liberalization and opening up to go ahead, and gave it his full support.

Singh says Rao was first a little sceptic about the liberalization idea and had to be persuaded.

"I had to persuade him. I think he was a sceptic to begin with, but later on he was convinced that what we were doing was the right thing to do, that there was no other way out. But he wanted to sanctify the middle path — that we should undertake liberalization but also take care of the marginalized sections, the poor," recounts Singh.

"He also jokingly told me that if things worked well we would all claim credit, and if things didn't work out well I would be sacked," he said.

Referring to the imposition of Emergency in 1975, Daman says it came as a surprise to her father.

"Well, it was a surprise. There had been unrest, but nobody expected that Mrs Gandhi would go that far," she said.

When his daughter asked him how the Emergency affected the government servants, Singh replied, "I think there was a lot more emphasis on punctuality, on discipline. So some good things happened."

After the Morarji Desai-led Janata Party won a majority and came to power post-Emergency, a number of officers were shunted out but Singh kept his job.

Initially, Singh felt Desai was not quite fond of him. "When Morarji Desai became prime minister he had been told that I was close to the previous government. So he was quite rude to begin with. But after some time, he became very fond of me. Morarji Desai was fairly balanced, although people misunderstand him as a very rigid man. I think on the surface he was rigid, but he was amenable to persuasion," Singh is quoted as saying.